explaining that “Penal Code section 118 prohibits both perjurious testimony under oath (the elements are set forth in CALJIC No. 7.20) and perjurious, signed declarations (covered by CALJIC No. 7.21)”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “Penal Code section 118 prohibits both perjurious testimony under oath (the elements are set forth in CALJIC No. 7.20) and perjurious, signed declarations (covered by CALJIC No. 7.21)”
- noting that, under Georgie law, issue of materiality was normally for the jury
- holding that materiality is an issue for the jury in perjury prosecution based on errors or omissions in disclosure statements required by the Political Reform Act
- holding that materiality is an issue for the jury in peijury prosecution based on errors or omissions in disclosure statements required by the Political Reform Act
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Declined to follow by People v. Cox, 53 Cal. 3d 618 (1991)
For several reasons, we decline to extend the holding in Hedgecock to situations in which the defendant merely seeks to place unsworn statements under oath by calling upon reluctant jurors to reiterate those statements from the witness stand.
The opinion
LUCAS, C. J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I join in the second part of Justice Eagleson’s concurrence and dissent concluding that there is no basis presented for departing from the long held rule that materiality in a perjury prosecution is an issue for the court to determine. In all other respects, I join in the majority opinion.