stating that “the damages provision [in § 52(a) ] allowing for an exemplary award of up to treble the actual damages suffered ... reveals a desire to punish intentional and morally offensive conduct”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “the damages provision [in § 52(a) ] allowing for an exemplary award of up to treble the actual damages suffered ... reveals a desire to punish intentional and morally offensive conduct”
- stating that judicial interference in economic policy matters would lead to myriad trials “with no prospect of certainty or stability in the respective rights and duties of the parties”
- "[A]s we have noted, the Act explicitly exempts standards that are applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability.... By its nature, an adverse impact claim challenges a standard that it applicable alike to all such persons based on the premise that, notwithstanding its universal applicability, its actual impact demands scrutiny. If the Legislature had intended to include adverse impact claims, it would have omitted or at least qualified this language...."
- analogizing from the subjective intent 2 requirement of § 1983
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Munson v. Del Taco, Inc.
52 Cal.3d 1142 (Harris), superseded by statute on another ground as noted in Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 664
The opinion
*1176 MOSK, J., Dissenting.
The majority hold, as a matter of law, that defendant’s minimum income policy does not violate the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Upon reflection, however, I must agree in principle with Justice Broussard’s dissent that plaintiffs here have pled a facially valid cause of action under the Unruh Act. Because there are factual issues unresolved, the issue could not be disposed of on demurrer.
As the Court of Appeal found, whether an announced policy is arbitrary or unreasonable is to be determined by a trier of fact. Is the three-times-rent criterion an accurate predictor of a tenant’s ability to meet his or her financial obligations? Is the criterion customarily used in the financial industry and, if so, is it reasonable? Is the criterion appropriate in all parts of the state, or do the variations in income levels render it valid in some locales and arbitrary in others? These and other questions clearly require a factual determination.
Since the majority determine these and similar issues on demurrer as a matter of law, I believe they err and therefore dissent.