observing that the majority “strips yet another procedural safeguard” from anyone accused of child sexual assault and “reverses a decade of precedent in the process” by concluding that the district court’s failure to hold a trustworthiness hearing is not grounds for automatic reversal and was harmless error
How later courts described this case
- observing that the majority “strips yet another procedural safeguard” from anyone accused of child sexual assault and “reverses a decade of precedent in the process” by concluding that the district court’s failure to hold a trustworthiness hearing is not grounds for automatic reversal and was harmless error
- stating that decision whether to admit prior bad act evidence is discretionary and will not be reversed absent a manifest abuse of 3 discretion
- explaining that language in NRS 201.230 makes “crimes of sexual assault and lewdness . . . mutually exclusive and convictions for both based upon a single act cannot stand”
- stating that "prior acts that are remote in time and involve conduct different from the charged conduct" are generally inadmissible (emphasis added)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Maupin, C. J.,
with whom Young, J., agrees,
concurring:
I agree that the judgments of conviction in this matter should be affirmed.
I disagree, however, that this court should overturn Findley v. State 1 and McMichael v. State 2 as authority for the proposition that evidence showing that an accused poses a propensity for sexual aberration may be relevant in prosecutions for sexual assault. In this, I believe that both cases formulate a rule that is consistent with the exceptions to the general rule of non-admissibility of “other crimes, wrongs or acts” under NRS 48.045(2) as proof of character.
19 Nev. 212, 214 , 577 P.2d 867, 868 (1978).
94 Nev. 184, 188 , 577 P.2d 398, 401 (1978), overruled on other grounds by Meador v. State, 101 Nev. 765 , 711 P.2d 852 (1985).