interpreter was merely a language conduit for Confrontation Clause and hearsay issue
How later courts described this case
- interpreter was merely a language conduit for Confrontation Clause and hearsay issue
- adopting language-conduit theory in a hearsay context
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MORENO, J., Concurring.
I agree with the majority’s holding that a sufficiently reliable translated statement is not hearsay. I write separately to emphasize that our opinion does not alter a defendant’s confrontation clause rights at a preliminary hearing. In People v. Miranda (2000) 23 Cal.4th 340, 354 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 758 , 1 P.3d 73 ], we held that the admission of single-level hearsay at a preliminary hearing does not violate a defendant’s confrontation clause rights. Our opinion today goes no further.
Under the language-conduit theory, once the accuracy and reliability of a translation is established, we consider the translated statement to be that of the original speaker. Consequently, we find that such a translation does not interpose a layer of hearsay. The confrontation clause concerns raised in the present case, then, relate to the introduction of single-level hearsay between the original declarant and the testifying officer. As we noted in Miranda , Proposition 115 “provides the defendant with opportunities at the preliminary examination to cross-examine and evaluate the testimony of a qualified *468 law enforcement officer relating single-level hearsay, and to call specified defense witnesses to rebut the prosecution’s case.” (People v. Miranda, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 354 .) Under those circumstances we found that the defendant’s confrontation clause rights were not violated. We do not decide in this case whether introduction of a second level of hearsay at a preliminary hearing would violate a defendant’s confrontation clause rights.