explaining that a state court may bar habeas claims under either California’s rule requiring a timely objection at trial or the Dixon bar, if both could apply
How later courts described this case
- explaining that a state court may bar habeas claims under either California’s rule requiring a timely objection at trial or the Dixon bar, if both could apply
- “What we mean when we invoke the Dixon bar is that the claim is based on the appellate record, and thus was fully cognizable on appeal insofar as it was preserved at trial.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BROWN, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I have previously expressed my view that “creating a Byzantine system of procedural hurdles, each riddled with exceptions and fact-intensive qualifications, only undermines ... the goals they purport to serve: integrity of judgments, finality, and comity.” (In re Gallego (1998) 18 Cal.4th 825, 842 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 132 , 959 P.2d 290 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.); see also In re Sanders (1999) 21 Cal.4th 697, 730 [ 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 899 , 981 P.2d 1038 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.).) Since, at least in the capital context, the court’s internal practice generally ensures full merit review irrespective of procedural bars (see Gallego, at p. 852 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.)), consideration of possible defaults can only delay finality and invite disregard in the federal courts given the difficulty in determining whether we invoke them with sufficient regularity. (See id. at pp. 843-845 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.).)
In this instance, the majority goes one better, formulating a quintessential form-over-substance rule. As the majority perforce acknowledges, any failure to preserve an appealable issue by appropriate objection at trial can—and will—be raised on habeas corpus, recast as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 200; see People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) *209 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267 [ 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437 , 933 P.2d 1134 ]; People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 732 , 590 P.2d 859 ].) In such a circumstance, we better serve the purpose of the ‘Great Writ’ (see In re Sanders, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 703-704; In re Begerow (1901) 133 Cal. 349, 353 [ 65 P. 828 ]) and the concern for promptly resolving these claims by “abandoning] the effort [to erect meaningless procedural impediments] in favor of the one certainty for ensuring expeditious review of capital habeas petitions: full merit review without regard to procedural bars. [Citation.]” (In re Gallego, supra, 18 Cal.4th 825, 851 (conc. & dis. opn. of Brown, J.).)
Expressing no opinion on the substantive merit of the majority’s discussion of forfeiture and lack of objection at trial, I agree petitioner has failed to state a prima facie claim with respect to claims II.A., II.B., II.C., and V.A. and therefore would deny relief and discharge the order to show cause on that basis.
Petitioner’s petition for a rehearing was denied September 29, 2004, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. George, C. J., did not participate therein.