recognizing that one death could result in only one homicide conviction under New Mexico law and holding that a defendant could not be punished separately for vehicular homicide and child abuse resulting in death, despite the fact that a mechanical application of the original Blockburger elements test would permit double punishment
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that one death could result in only one homicide conviction under New Mexico law and holding that a defendant could not be punished separately for vehicular homicide and child abuse resulting in death, despite the fact that a mechanical application of the original Blockburger elements test would permit double punishment
- stating that the “primary goal of the general/specific statute rule is to determine legislative intent in the context of potentially conflicting laws” and that the rule “provides a method to resolve an otherwise irreconcilable conflict between statutes” (emphasis added)
- stating that, under the general/specific statute rule, 18 “if two statutes dealing with the same subject conflict, the more specific statute will 19 prevail over the more general statute absent a clear expression of legislative intent 10 1 to the contrary”
- holding “that vehicular homicide is a lesser offense than child abuse resulting in death ... [b]ecause the Legislature did not intend to create separately punishable offenses” under those statutes for the same death
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FRANCHINI, Justice (dissenting)
{51} I share the concerns raised by Justice Minzner and concur in her dissent. I write separately to reiterate my opinion, expressed in my dissent in State v. Guilez, 129 N.M. 240 , 4 P.3d 1231 , 2000-NMSC-020 , ¶¶ 27-36, that the Motor Vehicle Code preempts the child abuse statute under Yarborough, 1996-NMSC-068 ¶¶ 26-29 , 122 N.M. 596 , 930 P.2d 131 .
{52} I also believe that the majority opinion misapplies the general/specifie rule. I agree with the majority that “if two statutes dealing with the same subject conflict, then the more specific statute will prevail over the more general statute----” Majority Opinion ¶ 7. In my view, application of that rule necessitates the dismissal of the child abuse convictions rather than vehicular homicide convictions, as the majority holds. The vehicular homicide statute prohibits “the killing of a human being in the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle.” NMSA § 66-8-101(A). The relevant section of the child abuse statute criminalizes “causing or permitting a child to be placed in a situation that may endanger the child’s life or health.” NMSA § 30-6-l(C). Because I believe that the vehicular homicide statute addresses Defendant’s criminal conduct with greater specificity, I would uphold the convictions based on that statute rather than the convictions based on the less specific child abuse statute.