recognizing that delusional state may excuse inurder when defendant believes they will suffer imminent harm, but not when that belief only suggests that they may suffer some future harm
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that delusional state may excuse inurder when defendant believes they will suffer imminent harm, but not when that belief only suggests that they may suffer some future harm
- setting 23 forth the M’Naghten standard for legal insanity—a defendant must be in a delusional state such that he cannot know or understand the 1 nature and capacity of his act, or his delusion must be such that he cannot appreciate the wrongfulness of his act
- holding that a lay witness may use words such as "crazy" or "abnormar to describe behavior but "should not be permitted to use the word 'insane since that is a term of are
- explaining that defendant is entitled to acquittal under the MWaghten test only "if the facts as he believed them to be in his delusional state would justify his actions"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Leavitt, L,
concurring:
I agree with the majority that the requirement of a mentally ill defendant to plead guilty but mentally ill deprives a defendant of liberty without due process of law and is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The attempt by the Legislature to wipe away more than a century of criminal jurisprudence tramples on the due process rights of mentally unsound defendants and is unconstitutional.
*579 The new procedure conflicts with several Nevada statutes.
The criminal justice system does not punish persons unable to form the intent necessary to commit a crime. Under current Nevada law, to constitute a crime there must be a joint operation of two essential elements, an act forbidden by law and an intent to do the act. 1 The intent with which an act is done is shown by the facts and circumstances of the case and the sound mind and discretion of the person accused. 2 A person of sound mind is one who knows the distinction between good and evil. 3
A defendant entering a plea of guilty to a criminal offense must do so voluntarily, knowingly and with an understanding of the elements of the crime to which the person is admitting guilt. 4 Additionally, a defendant entering a plea of guilty waives three valuable constitutional rights: the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by a jury, and the right to confront accusers. 5 Further, a defendant must understand the consequences of pleading guilty. 6 A defendant’s federal constitutional rights are involved when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal proceeding. 7 If a defendant’s mental illness at the time of the entry of the plea prevented the defendant from understanding the consequences of such action, the plea is involuntarily entered and must be set aside. A criminal defendant may not plead guilty unless he does so competently and intelligently. 8 Complicating the problem is the rule that when a person enters a plea of guilty, that person “may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” 9
A person who has pleaded guilty but mentally ill is incarcerated in the Nevada State Prison. Persons who may be incapable of committing crime because of mental illness should not be placed in prison with criminals who intentionally, willfully and knowingly commit crime. There is a clear difference between a person who may be incompetent and a mentally capable defendant. The criminal justice system has always recognized that dis *580 tinction. The new procedure makes the status of mental illness a crime, by confining a person who cannot form the necessary intent to commit a crime and whose only “crime” is mental illness. Such inflicted punishment is cruel and unusual in violation of the 8th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The legislative scheme as set forth in S.B. 314 10 must be set aside, and the law as it existed prior to its enactment be reinstated.
NRS 193.190.
NRS 193.200.
NRS 193.210.
Hove v. State, 99 Nev. 147, 147-48 , 659 P.2d 876, 877 (1983).
Higby v. Sheriff, 86 Nev. 774, 781 , 476 P.2d 959, 963 (1970).
Ramey v. State, 99 Nev. 264, 265 , 661 P.2d 1292, 1292 (1983).
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969), superceded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1990).
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993).
Webb v. State, 91 Nev. 469, 470 , 538 P.2d 164, 165 (1975) (quoting Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)).
S.B. 314, 67th Leg. (Nev. 1995), amending NRS 174.035, 193.220 and 194.010 and repealing 175.521.