Opinion

State v. Maynard

  • 168 Or. App. 118
  • 5 P.3d 1142
  • 2000 Ore. App. LEXIS 906
Court
Court of Appeals of Oregon
Filed
May 31, 2000
Status
Published
Author
Haselton
On the bench
Deits, Edmonds, De Muniz, Landau, Haselton, Armstrong, Wollheim, Brewer
Cited by
19 cases

holding that a defendant waived his appeal on a matter when the appellate 6 briefing contained no actual argument with regard to the application of the relevant 7 rule to the facts of the defendant’s case

How later courts described this case

  • holding that a defendant waived his appeal on a matter when the appellate 6 briefing contained no actual argument with regard to the application of the relevant 7 rule to the facts of the defendant’s case
  • invalidating statute that criminalized visual images of sexual conduct and sexual excitement "regardless of the significance of such depictions in the context of tire materials taken as a whole”
  • criticizing the dissent for following a "different method of analysis, which causes it to detour into an unnecessary examination of the historical exception doctrine"
  • discussing the context of ORS § 167.065(1), which has since been repealed

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

HASELTON, J.,

concurring.

I agree with the majority opinion that: (1) Under Stonemaris contextual analysis, ORS 167.065(l)(a) is “effects-based,” not “content-based.” (2) The “historical exception” analysis applies only to “content-based” statutes. And (3) ORS 167.065(l)(a) is unconstitutionally overbroad. Given those premises, it is unnecessary to reach, and I do not join in, the majority’s substantive discussion of whether the subject of ORS 167.065(l)(a) falls within a historically recognized exception. 1

This is not merely a matter of jurisprudential fastidiousness. I joined the majority in Maynard I in concluding that ORS 167.065(l)(a) did not fall within a historically recognized exception — as did Judge Landau. Judge Landau’s comprehensive dissent revisits that issue and presents provocative historical evidence and analysis far transcending anything we considered in Maynard 1.1 am not certain that Judge Landau’s historical conclusions are right — but I am far from certain that they are wrong. At the least, Judge Landau’s dissent highlights some very real and recurring concerns pertaining to the Robertson construct generally and the function and content of the “historically recognized exception” qualification specifically.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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