explaining that a plaintiff facing an anti-SLAPP motion "must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited."
How later courts described this case
- explaining that a plaintiff facing an anti-SLAPP motion "must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited."
- noting that Plaintiffs claims do not survive the motion to strike if Plaintiff cannot show that the cause of action has at least “minimal merit”
- commenting that Louisiana and California’s Anti-SLAPP statutes match "word for word”
- absent proof of perjury or fraud “[a] trial court’s conclusion that issues of material fact remain for trial necessarily implies that the judge finds at least some merit in the claim” and “compels the conclusion that there is probable cause” (quotations and alterations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Hutton v. HAFIF
28 Cal.4th 811, 824 , partially superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 547
The opinion
BROWN, J., Concurring.
Although I concur with most of the majority’s reasoning, I write separately because I find its distinction of Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 386 , 881 P.2d 1083 ] (Crow ley) unpersuasive. (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 824-825.) According to the majority, “[w]e did not, in Crowley , indicate whether we approved the result in Lucchesi [v. Giannini & Uniack (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 777 [ 205 Cal.Rptr. 62 ]] because . . . summary judgment may be denied on any of a number of procedural or technical grounds, or whether we agreed with Lucchesi that even a determination of the existence of triable issues would not establish *827 probable cause.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 825.) Based on this ambiguity in Crowley , the majority concludes that “[o]ur favorable but passing mention of Lucchesi... did not constitute a full endorsement of its reasoning . . . .” (Ibid.) After reviewing Crowley , I disagree.
In Crowley , Carole Katleman, represented by counsel (together, the defendants), filed a will contest, alleging six separate grounds for invalidating the will. (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 673 .) Arthur J. Crowley, the principal beneficiary of the will, filed a motion for summary adjudication. (Ibid) The probate court granted the motion as to one of the grounds, but “denied the motion as to the remaining grounds, ruling there were triable issues of material fact as to each.” (Ibid., italics added.) After prevailing in the will contest, Crowley sued the defendants for malicious prosecution. (Id. at p. 674.) In their demurrer to the malicious prosecution action, the defendants contended, “by denying Crowley’s motion for summary adjudication of issues as to all grounds of the will contest except lack of due execution, the probate court ‘necessarily determined’ there was probable cause for the remaining grounds . . . .” (Id. at p. 675.) We, however, rejected this contention in a footnote, finding it “was without merit for the reasons stated in Lucchesi . . . .” (Crowley, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 675, fn. 5 .)
Because the probate court denied the motion for summary adjudication in the will contest on the merits, our footnote in Crowley necessarily endorsed Lucchesi’s holding that “a determination of the existence of triable issues would not establish probable cause.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 825.) Like the majority, I disagree with this holding. (See id. at pp. 824-825.) I would therefore disapprove of Crowley to the extent it adopted this holding of Lucchesi .
Appellants’ petition for a rehearing was denied October 2, 2002.