explaining that despite a significant delay, the other factors weighed against a determination that the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial where the reasons for most of the delay were not by fault of the State or the court and a significant portion of the delay resulted from defense counsel's actions, specific requests, and replacement
How later courts described this case
- explaining that despite a significant delay, the other factors weighed against a determination that the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial where the reasons for most of the delay were not by fault of the State or the court and a significant portion of the delay resulted from defense counsel's actions, specific requests, and replacement
- holding that the statutory language defining implied malice accurately informs the jury of the distinction between express and implied malice
- holding that evidence of strangulation and other injuries to the victim and the absence of defensive injuries are factors a jury can rely on in concluding that the defendant committed a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing
- observing that a district court's discretion to limit cross-examination is narrow "where potential bias is at issue"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Maupin, C. L,
concurring and dissenting:
I agree that Leonard’s conviction should be affirmed, however, I agree with Rose, J., that this matter should be remanded for a new sentencing hearing.
Our criminal code enumerates four possible penalties for persons found guilty of murder in the first degree: death, imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole, imprisonment for life with the possibility of parole, or imprisonment for fifty years. 1 A jury may not impose the death penalty unless it unanimously finds beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance has been proved, and finds that any mitigating circumstance in the case fails to outweigh any aggravating circumstance(s). 2 Even when the circumstances of the case satisfy the prerequisites for the death penalty, a jury may still decline to impose it. 3 Because our statutory sentencing construct requires the jury to weigh the ultimate punishment for first degree murder in a different manner from the other possible sentences, the district court erred, in my view inadvertently, by implying or stating directly in several instances that the jury should weigh the sentences equally.
The improper standard first appeared in the jury questionnaire:
‘ ‘In your present state of mind, can you, if selected as a juror, consider equally all three [sic] possible forms of punishment and select the one that you feel is the most appropriate depending on the facts and the law?” While our law does not contemplate equal consideration, the questionnaire implies that it does.
More references to equal consideration of the sentences occurred during voir dire examination of the prospective jurors. By way of example, the prosecutor and defense counsel asked several of the prospective jurors if they could “give equal consideration” to the possible sentences. Also, in excusing at least two prospective jurors, the district court specifically stated that it was doing so based upon their inability to equally consider all three forms of punishment. Finally, the district court’s preliminary comments to the second panel of prospective jurors explained:
*87 I read [that] to you because as we inquire of you we will be asking you whether or not you can consider all three [sic] forms of punishment equally, because that is very important in this case.
The acquiescence between the district attorney and defense counsel that jurors must be able to consider all sentences equally, combined with the district court’s comments on the matter, demonstrate that the wrong standard for excusing prospective jurors was applied in several important instances. In reaching this conclusion, I note that there is absolutely no evidence of bad faith. Further, it is evident that all concerned meant to convey that the jury give “fair” consideration to all of the potential forms of punishment in accordance with relevant jury instructions. However, even though the district court correctly instructed the jury on the death penalty process prior to the deliberations, I cannot conclude that the cumulative effect of these repeated references to equal consideration and the exclusion of juror no. 129 did not compromise the process. That Leonard’s attorneys joined in creating the misconception does not alter the fact that this jury was left with the erroneous impression that the death penalty should be given equal consideration with the other possible penalties for first degree murder.
Improper exclusion of jurors violates the fundamental right to an impartial adjudicator, requiring reversal. 4 Further, the heightened degree of scrutiny required in death penalty cases compels that the process of jury selection be in strict accordance with the statutory scheme described above.
Individual misstatements regarding the role of the jury in the sentencing process do not in and of themselves require reversal. But, in my view, the cumulative effect of the comments made by all concerned necessitates reversal of this matter for a new penalty hearing.
NRS 200.030(4).
NRS 200.030(4)(a).
See Kramer v. State, 60 Nev. 262 , 108 P.2d 304 (1940).
See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987).