concluding that the legislature's appointment of a majority of Commission did not violate separation of powers, in part because the appointees served four-year terms, which the court found "significantly reduces the potential control that the legislative appointing authorities may have over their appointees."
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the legislature's appointment of a majority of Commission did not violate separation of powers, in part because the appointees served four-year terms, which the court found "significantly reduces the potential control that the legislative appointing authorities may have over their appointees."
- describing the chaos that could result from failing to apply the de facto officer doctrine
- FEHA requires a “causal link between the protected 2 activity and the employer’s action”
- identifying LRC v. Brown as among that “albeit not all” category
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KENNARD, J., Concurring.
In Obrien v. Jones (2000) 23 Cal.4th 40 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 205 , 999 P.2d 95 ], as here, this court considered a challenge under the California Constitution’s separation of powers provision (Cal. Const., art. Ill, § 3) to legislation authorizing interbranch appointments. In both cases, this court rejected the challenge. In Obrien I dissented ( 23 Cal.4th at p. 63 ), while here I concur, for reasons I now explain.
The laws at issue in Obrien v. Jones, supra, 23 Cal.4th 40 granted officers of the executive and legislative branches (the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee, and the Speaker of the Assembly) the authority to appoint and reappoint judges of the State Bar Court (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6079.1) and altered that court’s composition by eliminating public representation (id., § 6086.65). Summarizing my reasons for concluding that these laws were invalid, I wrote: “Because the State Bar Court operates as an arm of this court in hearing attorney discipline matters, and because this court has primary authority over attorney discipline, judges of the State Bar Court are subordinate judicial officers that must be answerable only to this court. Because the law at issue makes State Bar Court judges subservient to members of the political branches, and because it alters the composition of the State Bar Court in a way likely to reduce public confidence in the attorney discipline system, the law is invalid under the separation of powers clause of the California Constitution.” (Obrien v. Jones, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 63 .)
The law at issue here (Pub. Resources Code, § 30301) grants the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee, and the Speaker of the Assembly authority to appoint members of the California Coastal Commission, an administrative agency within the executive branch having as its main task the regulation of land use in the state’s coastal areas. In performing this task, the commission does not act as an arm of the Governor or of any other executive branch officer, but instead the commission operates independently. Like many administrative agencies, the commission’s role is not purely executive, but instead much of its work is quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial. As I have written, *59 interbranch appointments are justified when the appointee’s duties have this hybrid character. (Obrien v. Jones, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 69 (dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
In brief, the interbranch appointment laws at issue in Obrien , in my view, improperly invaded this court’s authority over attorney discipline, whereas the interbranch appointment laws at issue here do not improperly invade the traditional authority of the Governor or of any other constitutional officer of the executive branch. Moreover, the hybrid character of the California Coastal Commission’s duties provides adequate justification for interbranch appointments. For these reasons, I have added my signature to the court’s opinion.