holding that the State’s expert on sexual assault could properly testify rape was result of non-consensual sex and conclude that oral sodomy had occurred based upon her examination of physical evidence
How later courts described this case
- holding that the State’s expert on sexual assault could properly testify rape was result of non-consensual sex and conclude that oral sodomy had occurred based upon her examination of physical evidence
- summarizing similarities among the four cases, including the age of the white female victims, that they all lived alone and within three miles of each other, how and when their homes were broken into, that all four were raped in their own bedrooms, the time at which the attacks occurred, the type of beatings, abuse, and injuries that all four victims endured, the proximity of the victims' homes to where the defendant was living at the time, etc.
- finding improperly admitted victim impact testimony introduced in the sentencing stage of a capital trial did not cause "the verdict to be the result of an unreasonable emotional response."
- holding Appellant must present evidence, not speculation, second guesses or innuendo in order to meet clear and convincing standard of Rule 3.11
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHAPEL, J. and STRUBHAR, J.;:
concur in result.
1 177 Appendix
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law
Now on this 2nd day of June 2000, this matter comes up for ruling on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Speedy Trial The Court having previously heard evidence on this matter on May 26, 2000. The State of Oklahoma appears by Richard Wintory, and the defendant appears by his attorney Craig D. Corgan. The Court hereby finds as follows:
1. On May 22, 2000, defendant's trial for the murder of Anna Fowler and Zelma Cutler was scheduled to begin before this Court. The trial date was stricken at the request of the defendant in order for the defendant to produce evidence in support of his Motion to Dismiss.
2. The Court and the State could have tried this case in May or June of 2000 but at the request of the defendant, the proceedings were stayed to allow the defendant to litigate his speedy trial issue.
3. The defendant wants a speedy trial and an appeal and thereby objected to this Court setting the case for trial on Monday, June 5 of 2000.
4. On May 26, 2000, this Court heard evidence presented by the defendant and the State. The matter was continued to June 2, 2000, pending the ruling of this Court.
5. Anna Fowler, (approximately age 88) was found dead in her home in Oklahoma City on September 3, 1986. Zelma Cutler, {(approximately age 90) was found dead in her home across the street from Mrs. Fowler's residence on January 11, 1987. Evidence of semen found at both crime scenes and in the victim's bodies indicated both victims had been raped before being murdered.
6. The defendant, Ronald Lott ("defendant"), is charged with the rapes and murders of both Anna Fowler and Zelma Cutler.
7. On May 12, 1988, the co-defendant, Robert Lee Miller, Jr., was convicted of the rapes and murders of Mrs. Fowler and Mrs. Cutler. At the same time, defendant Ronald Lott had not yet been identified as a perpetrator.
*360 8. Subsequent DNA testing initiated by Robert Lee Miller, Jr., exonerated him as being the source of the semen samples found inside the bodies of Mrs. Fowler and Mrs. Cutler and at the same time inculpated Ronald Lott who was already serving time for the rape of two other elderly females ("the 1987 rapes").
9. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed and remanded the case on Robert Lee Miller, Jr. as a result of the new DNA evidence.
10. The State filed charges on Ronald Lott on March 10, 1995, and subsequently dismissed the charges on January 30, 1996 pending further investigation.
11. The State refiled the charges against Ronald Lott in this case in 1997 while the defendant was still being held by the Department of Corrections for the 1987 rapes.
12. On September 9, 1997, defendant Lott's preliminary hearing in this case was set on November 3, 1997.
13. On November 8, 1997 the preliminary hearing began. Further evidence was presented over the course of the following dates:
December 18, 1997
December 19, 1997
January 30, 1998
February 13, 1998
March 20, 1998
14. Based on the complicated nature of this case as well as the number of witnesses called the State, the preliminary hearing was not concluded until March 30, 1998. However, at no time during the course of the hearing did the defendant raise an objection to the lengthy nature of hearing.
15. Defendant discharged his sentence for the 1987 rapes in February 1998 during the preliminary hearing proceedings on the present case.
16. On March 20, 1998, at the conclusion of the State's case, the Honorable Judge Charles Humble bound the defendant over for trial. At the conclusion of the hearing, defendant Lott requested immediate receipt of the preliminary hearing tran-seripts at public expense. Counsel for the defendant stated on the record that he wanted the transcripts in order to prepare certain motions to be filed. (See Preliminary Hearing Transeript March 20, 1998, Pg. 105-106.) Judge Humble advised counsel of the proper procedure to be followed to obtain the transcript. The case was then set for pre-trial before Judge Charles Owens on May 1, 1998.
17. Despite being told at the conclusion of the preliminary hearing how to do so, defense counsel did not request the tran-seripts until July 15, 1998.
18. On May 1, 1998 the pre-trial was continued by agreement of parties to August 26, 1998 to allow for the preliminary transcripts to be completed. While defendant's current counsel asserts such tran-seripts were not vital to the Court's rulings on the defendant's motions, this Court finds that defendant's attorney at the time was reasonable and prudent in believing the Court would have considered the evidence offered at preliminary hearing to be relevant to the Court's proceedings.
19. On August 26, 1998, the pre-trial hearing was continued to October 27, 1998 to again allow for the preliminary hearing transcripts to be completed. The final transcript from the preliminary hearing was completed and filed with the Court Clerk on September 21, 1998.
20. On October 27, 1998 the pre-trial was continued to November 30, 1998 and then to February 1, 1999 as Judge Charles Owens was retiring from the bench. Judge Owens chose not to hear the pre-trial motions since he would not be the presiding Judge of the trial.
21. There is no record that the defendant requested a trial date while this case was pending before Judge Charles Owens.
22. Based on Sherry Mighton's testimony, this Court finds that Judge Charles Owens docket was such that he could not have tried a case of this magnitude between October 1998 and his retirement in January of 1999.
28. On February 1, 1999 both parties, including the defendant, appeared before *361 Judge Susan Bragg who had taken over Judge Charles Owens docket. Judge Bragg informed both parties that she could not preside over this case because she had worked on it while employed as an Assistant District Attorney. The case was then re-assigned to the undersigned judge and the pre-trial was set for March 1, 1999.
24. On March 1, 1999, the pre-trial was continued to March 18, 1999 and then to March 31, 1999. One of the continuances was due to Joe Robertson, counsel for the defendant, not appearing for the motion hearing.
25. On March 81, 1999 both parties appeared before this Court. The State appeared by Richard Wintory and Greg Mas-burn and the Defendant appeared by his attorney Joe Robertson. Although this Court has no independent recollection of ruling on the defendant's pre-trial motions on said date, the paperwork held by the State indicated the language and ruling of this Court would have made regarding said motions.
26. To this date three different attorneys from the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System have. represented the defendant since the preliminary hearing began. These attorneys are Silas Lyman, Joe Robertson and Craig Corgan.
27. The State has only requested two continuances in this case. The first continuance on September 28, 1999 was requested to allow the State to submit hair sample for new type of DNA testing (Mitochondrial Testing) not previously available to either party. Such evidence results could be either inculpatory or exeulpatory in nature and therefore necessary evidence to be presented at trial. The trial was rescheduled to begin on March 27, 2000.
28. The second continuance requested by the State was on February 15, 2000, after being notified by LabCorp. of its inability to procure sufficient DNA result for the hair samples sent to them in October of 1999. Additional hair samples were then sent to LabCorp. on February 9, 2000. On February 17, 2000, the Court moved the trial two weeks from March 27, 2000 to April 10, 2000.
29. On March 10, 2000, a three judge panel continued the case to May 22, 2000 because of docket scheduling conflicts of the attorneys for both the State and the defendant.
30. Judges Black, Caswell, and Gray met and scheduled major cases involving the same lawyers. The matter was rescheduled for March 27, 2000.
31. The only two objections to continuance filed by the defendant were in response to the State's second motion for continuance dated February 16, 2000 and the objection to the scheduling continuance to March 27, 2000.
82. Article 2, § 6 of the Constitution requires that justice be administered without delay and forbids any unreasonable delays by the State.
33. The two requested delays caused by the State in this case were not unreasonable, but in fact were reasonable and prudent actions taken by the State in order to provide possible exculpatory evidence to the defense.
34. Any delay in this case is a result of due diligence on the part of the State and the defense to get the information they need to try this case and present the evidence of the case.
35. All of the cases cited by the defendant in support of his motion to dismiss are easily distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar.
36. Specifically, in Pickle v. Bliss, 418 P.2d 69 (1966), the Court found that the delay was due to laches on the part of the State. There is no evidence of laches on the part of the State in this case.
37. In Green v. Oklahoma, 713 P.2d 1032 (1985), all of the time frames that are involved are pre-accusation and do not apply to the right to speedy jury trial.
38. In State ex. rel. Trusty v. Graham, 1974 OK CR 146 , 525 P.2d 1281 , there was a showing of prejudice to the defense and the prosecution did not show any legal cause for the delay. In the instant case there has been no showing of prejudice to *362 the defendant and the State has shown cause for the delay.
39. The defendant cites three forms of prejudice as a result of the delays in this case: 1) not being able to have contact visits with his family as he did while he was in the custody of the Department of Correction; 2) not having the benefit of cross-examination of Janice Davis because she is now deceased; 3) the State has been able to strengthen it's case since the conclusion of the preliminary hearing due to advances in technology.
40. There is no prejudice to the defendant in regards to his visitation rights with his family. The defendant admits that his family had not been to se him during the last year he was in the custody of the Department of Corrections.
41. There is no prejudice to the defendant resulting from the death of Janice Davis, caused by any delay attributable to the State. Ms. Davis was deceased prior to the defendant being identified as a perpetrator in this case; therefore Ms. Davis was not available to testify on the day or at any time subsequent to the discovery of the defendant's involvement in this case.
42. There is no prejudice to the defendant even though the testing of forensic evidence in the present case proved favorable to the State. Such testing could have benefited the defendant had it been exeul-patory in nature.
43. The pre-trial testing of forensic evidence based on the discovery of anew and more accurate testing procedure prevents the necessity of such testing during appeal to determine whether a new trial is warranted.
44. This Court's trial dockets consists of fourteen murder cases and over 800 felony cases that make it difficult to schedule a case of this magnitude within five months of the defendant requesting a trial date.
IT IS THEREFORE the ruling of the court that the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of a Speedy Trial is overruled and the trial is hereby reset to November 6, 2000 at the request of the Defendant.
(0.R.539-544) (emphasis in original).