concluding that, in light of the totality of the jury charge and the trial evidence demonstrating the appellant’s accomplices’ interest in testifying for the Commonwealth, the appellant failed to establish the prejudice prong of his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for not pursuing a claim regarding a “corrupt and polluted source” instouction
How later courts described this case
- concluding that, in light of the totality of the jury charge and the trial evidence demonstrating the appellant’s accomplices’ interest in testifying for the Commonwealth, the appellant failed to establish the prejudice prong of his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for not pursuing a claim regarding a “corrupt and polluted source” instouction
- concluding witness’s post-trial affidavit stating she saw someone other than defendant shoot victim, which was contrary to her statements to police and testimony at trial, did not constitute after-discovered evidence of defendant's actual innocence and thus did not provide grounds to grant defendant new trial on murder charge
- holding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to investigate the defendant’s mental health and present a diminished capacity defense because the defendant denied participation in the crime
- stating, “we will not find counsel ineffective for failing to present a defense that would have conflicted with [his] testimony.” (citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
dissenting.
This case reflects multiple irregularities, which are far too prevalent in the capital post-conviction arena. The matter has languished in the PCRA court for the better part of two decades. Several attorneys who have represented Appellant on post-conviction did very little or nothing to advance the case. See Majority Opinion, at 619-20, 17 A.3d at 880-81. After the Defender Association of Philadelphia entered their appearance, the PCRA court attempted to dismiss the amended petition in a perfunctory fashion, yielding a remand. See id. at 621, 17 A.3d at 881. Such dismissal was obviously unjustified, as, in the ensuing proceedings — albeit five years later — the Commonwealth stipulated to penalty relief based on deficient performance by Appellant’s trial counsel. See id. at 621-22, 17 A.3d at 882. Presently, we are confronted with an incomplete PCRA court opinion after a second summary dis *678 missal of guilt-phase claims. See id. at 624-25, 17 A.3d at 883-84.
This Court has spoken of a “considerable degree of discretion afforded to PCRA courts in disposing of collateral petitions under the PCRA.” Given the unconscionable delay, disarray, and inconsistencies we are seeing in these cases, I fail to see how this sort of generalized deference can be justified any longer.
I have observed on previous occasions that “the Court would give better effect to the values of regularity and fairness that are essential to the judicial function by requiring closer and more consistent adherence to the procedures that have been designed to ensure the reliability of criminal convictions, particularly in the capital arena, where the need for reliability is at its greatest.” Commonwealth v. Bryant, 579 Pa. 119, 164 , 855 A.2d 726, 752 (2004) (Saylor, J., dissenting); accord Commonwealth v. Carson, 590 Pa. 501, 617 , 913 A.2d 220, 288-89 (2006) (Saylor, J., concurring and dissenting). In light of the many instances in which my comments have gone unobserved by the Court at large, I have attempted to abide by the majority position that the courts may make some cold-record credibility determinations. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Small, 602 Pa. 425, 484-85 , 980 A.2d 549, 584-85 (2009) (Saylor, J., concurring). To my knowledge, however, no workable standard has been announced to guide the courts in the evenhanded dispensation of such decisions, and the affordance of “considerable discretion” yields far too much room for inconsistent treatment depending on the predilections of individual jurists. Commonwealth v. Williams, 602 Pa. 360, 401 , 980 A.2d 510, 535 (2009) (Saylor, J., dissenting) (“The alternative [to a consistent approach on this Court’s part] is that the availability of hearings in post-conviction matters will depend on different judges’ individual thresholds for making credibility assessments without actually hearing the witnesses, and thus, the administration of justice will be uneven.”). Moreover, at some point, as we continue to see the unjust mismanagement, or non-management, of these cases — with twenty years on state post-conviction being simply incomprehensible — there merely comes a breaking point.
*679 In my view, the Court must require uniform, strict adherence to the requirements of pre-dismissal notice containing reasonably specific notice of pleading deficiencies or other reasons for summary dismissal and uniformly dispense hearings where credibility matters are materially in issue. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B). 1 It is also apparent that we need better enforcement of the time track established in our criminal procedural rules. See id. This case, and the many others like it, demonstrates the need for immediate reform.
As I believe Appellant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, I respectfully dissent in favor of a remand for a prompt hearing and essential fact-finding by the PCRA court.
. Addressing claims in the absence of fact-finding fosters appellate-level superficialities and incongruities. For example, in the present case, the majority explains that a recantation declaration provided by eyewitness Betty Harris cannot be after-discovered evidence, because counsel could have learned of the information by interviewing her prior to trial. See Majority Opinion, Op. at 628-30, 17 A.3d at 886-87. Nevertheless, in addressing the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview Ms. Harris, the majority reasons that waiting until trial gave Ms. Harris "every opportunity” to provide the information. Id. at 633, 17 A.3d at 889. In addition to the facial tension between these two dispositions, this Court generally recognizes that an adequate pre-trial investigation is a prerequisite to a reasonable strategy. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 454 , 856 A.2d 767, 784 (2004). Moreover, the duty to investigate may include a duty to interview key witnesses. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 600 Pa. 329, 351 , 966 A.2d 523, 535-36 (2009). Therefore, I find it difficult to accept the majority's present proposition that an attorney can curtail a defense guilt-phase, pre-trial investigation merely because he will have the ability to confront key witnesses in the trial proceedings.
The alleged lack of an adequate pre-trial, guilt-phase investigation is also particularly troublesome where, as here, the Commonwealth is stipulating that counsel rendered deficient stewardship relative to the other critical phase of the trial.