observing that this Court does not weigh competing societal interests against one another, but assumes the General Assembly, as a policy-making body, has already done so in enacting legislation (citing Program Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Dauphin Cty. Gen. Auth., 593 Pa. 184, 192 , 928 A.2d 1013, 1017-18 (2007))
How later courts described this case
- observing that this Court does not weigh competing societal interests against one another, but assumes the General Assembly, as a policy-making body, has already done so in enacting legislation (citing Program Admin. Servs., Inc. v. Dauphin Cty. Gen. Auth., 593 Pa. 184, 192 , 928 A.2d 1013, 1017-18 (2007))
- observing that it is improper for reviewing courts to supply statutory omissions, even those resulting from legislative inadvertence (citing Commonwealth v. Shafer, 414 Pa. 613, 621, 202 A.2d 308, 312 (1964))
- stating that an appellate court will not disturb a judgment, order, or decree for harmless error
- “In its official comment regarding [the pre- amendment version of subsection 5601(c)], the Legislature specified that a primary purpose of the notice requirement is to protect the principal; it was not evidently aimed at protecting third parties.” (superseded by statute)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice McCAFFERY,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s determination that Section 5608 of the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code, 20 Pa.C.S. 5608, does not apply in the present case. However, my reasons are narrower than those adopted in the majority opinion, and I believe they avoid altogether the understandable dispute that has arisen between the majority and the dissenting views regarding the General Assembly’s broad intent behind Section 5608(b). Indeed, there is no need for this Court to rule now upon the serious issues that divide the majority and dissent regarding their differing interpretations of Section 5608(b). Accordingly, I believe that we should not make any sweeping interpretation on the issue of Section 5608’s third-party immunity provisions, lest that interpretation lead to unintended and unfortunate consequences by its future application.
Both the majority and dissent correctly conclude that subsections (a) and (b) of Section 5608 must be read in conjunction with each other. Subsection (a) defines third-party liability, and provides in relevant part:
(a) Third party liability. — Any person who is given instructions by an agent in accordance with the terms of a power of attorney shall comply with the instructions. Any person who without reasonable cause fails to comply with *677 those instructions shall be subject to civil liability for any damages resulting from noncompliance.
20 Pa.C.S. § 5608(a) (emphasis added).
Subsection (b) addresses, in my view, the immunity conferred for the liability defined by subsection (a). Subsection (b) provides:
(b) Third party immunity. — Any person who acts in good faith reliance on a power of attorney shall incur no liability as a result of acting in accordance with the instructions of the agent.
20 Pa.C.S. § 5608(b) (emphasis added).
As I read this legislation, “liability” for purposes of both subsections (a) and (b) involves only civil liability for damages. The present appeal does not stem from an underlying civil action for damages. Rather, this case involves a simple administrative appeal whereby Appellant sought a change of retirement payout option from the agency in charge of administering the retirement funds toward which she had contributed significant funds. Accordingly, because that agency (SERS) is not the defendant in a civil action seeking damages, it has no basis upon which to assert the immunity provisions of Section 5608(b); hence, Section 5608 does not apply to the instant appeal. On these grounds alone, I concur with the majority opinion that the Commonwealth Court and the SERS Board erred by barring Appellant’s administrative action based on Section 5608.
Because Section 5608 does not apply to the instant case, issues remain regarding whether (1) the power of attorney at issue here, executed while Appellant was mentally incapacitated according to the factual findings of the hearing examiner, was valid under general principles of law; (2) the SERS Board has jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute; and (3) the SERS Board has the power to grant Appellant’s request for a change of retirement option. I believe that the majority opinion has fully and appropriately addressed these issues, and I join the majority’s analysis and disposition of them. Therefore, I concur with the majority’s decision to reverse the order of the *678 Commonwealth Court and remand this matter to the SERS Board for further proceedings.