holding that the prosecutor's agreement that he would "not file formal charges if [the appellant] would obtain a psychiatric evaluation" was an 1Thecircuit court also appears to have concluded that the alleged agreement was an immunity agreement. (R. 173.) 13 CR-2022-0521 " 'informal immunity' " agreement and was "clearly not" a plea agreement (quoting Howe, 2 Neb. App. At 773, 514 N.W.2d at 362 )
How later courts described this case
- holding that the prosecutor's agreement that he would "not file formal charges if [the appellant] would obtain a psychiatric evaluation" was an 1Thecircuit court also appears to have concluded that the alleged agreement was an immunity agreement. (R. 173.) 13 CR-2022-0521 " 'informal immunity' " agreement and was "clearly not" a plea agreement (quoting Howe, 2 Neb. App. At 773, 514 N.W.2d at 362 )
- holding that, “when the State has entered into an agreement not to prosecute with a prospective defendant and the defendant has performed and acted to his detriment or prejudice in reliance upon that agreement, the government must be required to honor such an agreement.”
- "A 'pure plea bargain agreement' involves ' "a suspect who has been apprehended for allegedly committing a crime and, rather than face the prospects of an extended trial and a punishment of undetermined severity if convicted, decides to plead guilty to charges mutually acceptable to him and the prosecutor." ' " (quoting State v. Howe, 2 Neb. App. 766, 772 , 514 N.W.2d 356, 361 (1994), quoting in turn United States v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 551 F.2d 1106 , 1111- 12 (8th Cir. 1977))
- accepting a State appeal involving an issue on which there were no Arkansas cases precisely on point
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HANNAH, CJ., dissents.
li>i>I respectfully dissent. The appeal should be dismissed because the State is not entitled to an appeal, pursuant to Ark. R App. P.-Criminal 3(c).
Appellee complied in good faith with the terms of the agreement to forbear prosecution and is entitled to enforce the agreement on its terms. 1 Detrimental reliance was not a term of the contract and is irrelevant to the analysis. Under Hammers, 261 Ark. 585, 600 , 550 S.W.2d 432, 439 (1977), a criminal defendant is “equitably entitled to have his or her agreement with the prosecutor enforced if he or she has complied with its terms in good faith.” Hammers controls and as settled law deprives the State of its opportunity to appeal under Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure-Criminal 3 because the correct and uniform administration of the law is not at issue. See Ark. R.App. P.-Crim. 3(c).
Detrimental reliance applies only in the absence of a binding agreement with the prosecutor. It may permit a criminal defendant to enforce a promise, for example, in plea negotiations. In that case, although the prosecutor may make an offer, and the criminal defendant may express a willingness to accept the offer, no binding agreement can be created between the prosecutor and the criminal defendant because the plea must be approved by the circuit court. See Caldwell v. State, 295 Ark. 149, 152 , 747 S.W.2d 99, 101 (1988) (“The parties have no power to bind the court, and thus it is illusory to say the state is bound by |gjsuch an agreement before it is consummated by the acceptance of a guilty plea by the court.”). In such a case, the criminal defendant must show detrimental reliance to enforce the plea. Id., 747 S.W.2d at 101 (“[A]bsent a showing of acceptance of a plea of guilty based upon agreement and absent a showing of other detrimental reliance upon the agreement, Caldwell was not entitled to enforcement of it.”).
In the present case, the prosecutor made an offer to forbear prosecution, a right held by the prosecutor that in no way involved the court. See, e.g., Nance v. State, 323 Ark. 583, 595 , 918 S.W.2d 114, 119 (1996); see also, Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 118 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) (noting that there is no judicial review of the decision to prosecute). Once the prosecution’s offer was accepted, and appellee performed, he was equitably entitled to enforce the agreement on its terms. Hammers, 261 Ark. at 600 , 550 S.W.2d at 439 . Again, the terms of the agreement did not require him to show detrimental reliance.
I agree that the circuit court was correct in enforcing the terms of the contract; however, the issue on appeal was settled in Hammers. I would hold that the State’s appeal be dismissed because it was not entitled to an appeal under Rule 3.
. I note that the prosecutor attempted to "revoke” the offer; however, the offer had been accepted, and it was too late to revoke it. The offer was made before the prosecutor reviewed the material on the computer and determined its seriousness. I find it troubling that such an offer was made without a careful review of the evidence; however, the prosecutor is now bound by his agreement.