denying petition for writ of prohibition that alleged a complaint challenging the adequacy of public education violated the separation of powers doctrine
How later courts described this case
- denying petition for writ of prohibition that alleged a complaint challenging the adequacy of public education violated the separation of powers doctrine
- “The caselaw is clear that ‘[certio-rari is not designed to serve as a writ of expediency and should not be granted merely to relieve the petitioners seeking the writ from the expense and inconvenience of a trial.’ ” (quoting Whiteside v. Johnson, 351 So.2d 759, 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977))
- discussing a constitutional challenge to the adequacy of the educational system
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PADOVANO, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the state that the certified question in the plurality opinion is ineffective to establish a basis for the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in the Florida Supreme Court. See, Floridians for a Level Playing Field v. Floridians Against Expanded Gambling, 967 So.2d 882 (Fla.2007). However, I join in the court’s decision to deny the state’s motion for clarification for two reasons. First, the error identified by the solicitor general — that a majority of the judges of this court did not join in the decision on the issue that was certified — is not one that can be corrected at this point merely by clarifying the opinion. Second, the inadequacy of the certification will make little difference, given the fact that the decision of this court could be reviewed in the Florida Supreme Court on another ground. The supreme court could exercise its discretionary review jurisdiction in this case on the ground that the decision of this court is a decision expressly construing a provision of the Florida *482 Constitution. See Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. (1968); Zingale v. Powell, 885 So.2d 277 , 279 n.1 (Fla.2004); Malicki v. Doe, 814 So.2d 347 , 351 n. 1 (Fla.2002). The en banc decision of this court consists of two separate opinions, but both of them expressly construe the state constitution, albeit for the limited purpose of resolving the jurisdictional issue presented by the petition for writ of prohibition.
I have offered this explanation and potential solution, because the problem is one that was created by the court, not by the parties or their lawyers, and because I believe that the point made in the solicitor general’s motion is deserving of a response. My remarks should not be taken as a suggestion that the Florida Supreme Court should accept this case for review. That is a decision for the supreme court.
For these reasons, I vote to deny the motion for clarification. Because I continue to believe that the plurality opinion is correct, I vote to deny the motion for rehearing without further comment.