holding that a local gun ordinance making the sale of firearms on county property a misdemeanor was not preempted by a state law prohibiting the sale of assault weapons and unsafe handguns/finding that “the Ordinance does not criminalize precisely the same acts which are prohibited by statute”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a local gun ordinance making the sale of firearms on county property a misdemeanor was not preempted by a state law prohibiting the sale of assault weapons and unsafe handguns/finding that “the Ordinance does not criminalize precisely the same acts which are prohibited by statute”
- holding that a gun control ordinance, which expressly “prohibits and punishes as a 7 misdemeanor ‘the sale of firearms and/or ammunition on County property’” was not preempted by 8 state law, “given that the violation of a County ordinance is a misdemeanor” under § 25132(a)
- noting 5 that “licensing” is understood to signify “permission or authorization” and “registration” to mean 6 “recording formally and exactly”
- superseded by statute as stated in People v. Brooks, 3 Cal. 5 th 1 (2017)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BROWN, J., Dissenting.
By enacting an ordinance prohibiting the sale of firearms on county property (L.A. County Code, ch. 13.67, § 13.67.030) and enforcing the ordinance with respect to the Los Angeles County Fairgrounds, Los Angeles County seeks to regulate affairs within the City of Pomona, an incorporated city. It cannot do so. (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7; In re Knight (1921) 55 Cal.App. 511, 517-518 [ 203 P. 777 ]; Ex parte Pfirrmann (1901) 134 Cal. 143, 145 [ 66 P. 205 ].) Citing Hall v. City of Taft (1956) 47 Cal.2d 177 [ 302 P.2d 574 ], the majority carves out an exception for county regulations governing the use of county property. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 871-872.) I agree that Los Angeles County is free to manage its property in the City of Pomona without local interference. (Hall v. City of Taft , at p. 183.) Pomona may not, for example, dictate the terms of the county’s leases. But this exception applies only where a county is acting in its capacity as a property owner. (Ibid.) The exception does not permit a county to enact police power regulations governing the use of its property by independent parties to whom it has leased the property, because when the Legislature creates an incorporated city, it delegates that regulatory authority to the city, taking it away from the county. (In re Knight, at p. 518; Ex parte Pfirrmann, at p. 145.)
In Hall v. City of Taft, for example, the school district—a creature of state law—was acting in its capacity as a property owner by constructing a public building on its property. We said that the school district in that circumstance was not subject to local building regulations. (Hall v. City of Taft, supra, 47 Cal.2d at pp. 183-189.) We expressly distinguished situations in which the district “enact[s] laws for the conduct of the public at large.” (Id. at p. 183.) In that case, the regulatory authority would lie with the city, not the school district.
Los Angeles County, as a property owner, is free to prohibit the sale of firearms on its property. The county, however, has leased the Los Angeles County Fairgrounds to an independent party, and therefore, with respect to that property, it has contractually relinquished its property rights, at least in part. Depending on the terms of the lease, the county may have some control over the uses to which its tenant puts the property, or it may be able to *874 amend its lease to prohibit firearm sales. But the county must act in its capacity as a property owner. To the extent the county has contractually relinquished its property rights, it may not use its regulatory authority to retain control, because as soon as the county acts in its regulatory capacity, it ceases to fall within the exception we recognized in Hall v. City of Taft, supra, 47 Cal.2d 177 .
When Los Angeles County enacted an ordinance prohibiting firearm sales on county property, it was not merely acting as a property owner. Rather, it was attempting to regulate the actions of its tenants, and therefore it was “enacting laws for the conduct of the public at large.” (Hall v. City of Taft, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 183 .) This it could not do within the City of Pomona.
Accordingly, I dissent.