recognizing that the components of harmless-error analysis applicable to an evidentiary ruling in the guilt phase of a capital-murder trial are whether there is overwhelming evidence of guilt and the error is slight
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that the components of harmless-error analysis applicable to an evidentiary ruling in the guilt phase of a capital-murder trial are whether there is overwhelming evidence of guilt and the error is slight
- concluding that no requirement “that all jurors be brought in for voir dire and not be excluded based on . . . their beliefs about the death penalty . . . . exists under either state or federal law”
- holding that testimony concerning previous acts of violence was admissible where the information formed the basis of the forensic evaluator’s opinion
- ”[A]lthough there was no consensus among the expert opinions as to exactly what Miller’s intelligence quotient was, all experts agreed that it was above 65.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JIM HANNAH, Chief Justice, concurring.
I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse and remand this case for resen-fencing. However, I write separately because I would affirm the denial of the motion to suppress on different grounds. The officers arrived at the apartment to check on Miller based on a suicide concern called in by Miller’s father. Inside the apartment, the officers noticed a photograph of Miller with a woman and two young children. They also noticed a smudge or blot of dried blood on the door. There was an odor that was described by officer Derek Harwood as a “foul odor” and a “vile odor.” Paramedic Aaron Cole Beauford described the odor as smelling like someone had tried to cook wild game and burned it. Paramedic Rachel Kennon described the smell as a “horrible odor” and like “burnt Spam.” Officer Stephen Hutchinson testified that, he had a cold on the day he went to Miller’s apartment, and could not smell odors well, but he noticed a “bathroom 147odor.” Miller told the officers that he and his girlfriend had been fighting. These are the alleged exigent circumstances in this case.
Where a search is undertaken in the absence of a warrant, there must be probable cause and exigent circumstances. Steinmetz v. State, 366 Ark. 222, 225 , 234 S.W.3d 302, 304 (2006). Miller failed to attack the search based on probable cause. However, he did assert there were no exigent circumstances. The majority errs in concluding that the search was proper due to exigent circumstances. “Exigent circumstances are those requiring immediate aid or action.” Mann v. State, 357 Ark. 159, 167 , 161 S.W.3d 826, 831 (2004) (quoting Humphrey v. State, 327 Ark. 753, 766 , 940 S.W.2d 860, 867 (1997)). There was no evidence of any immediate danger to property or a person that required immediate action. While the majority holds there were exigent circumstances in that there was a concern for fire, or explosion, and the welfare of the children, the evidence does not support the conclusion. The evidence shows that there was a vile odor in the apartment and that officers had a reasonable concern children might be present. However, Officer Hutchinson testified that he never heard “sounds or anything indicating that there were children in the apartment.” In this case, nothing required immediate action, and there was no reason officers could not have remained at the apartment and waited for a proper warrant before conducting the search.
Nevertheless, the denial of the motion to suppress should be affirmed because Miller gave the officers his key to lock up and implicitly consented to the officers quickly checking the apartment to assure all was well before locking the door. The victim’s foot was in plain l4Ssight and would have been discovered. The court relied on exigent circumstances in error. The majority misinterprets the law, and as a consequence of that error, improperly broadens the application of exigent circumstances.