Opinion

Alonzo v. State

  • 46 So. 3d 1081
  • 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 16266
  • 2010 WL 4226497
Court
District Court of Appeal of Florida
Filed
Oct 27, 2010
Status
Published
Author
Ramirez
On the bench
Ramirez, Wells, Lagoa
Cited by
5 cases
Authority
More cited than 11.0%

holding that pretext may be established where a prospective juror is struck for a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror; where the alleged disparate treatment of jurors is based on racial grounds and "the record fails to identify the respective race of the challenged and unchallenged jurors, the appellate court cannot determine if pretext exists"

How later courts described this case

  • holding that pretext may be established where a prospective juror is struck for a reason equally applicable to an unchallenged juror; where the alleged disparate treatment of jurors is based on racial grounds and "the record fails to identify the respective race of the challenged and unchallenged jurors, the appellate court cannot determine if pretext exists"
  • explaining that a trial court's genuineness analysis, under Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1996), may be implicit
  • “If the record fails to identify the respective race of the challenged and unchallenged jurors, the appellate court cannot determine if pretext exists.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

RAMIREZ, C.J.

I respectfully dissent.

Although proper compliance with Melbourne does not mandate the “incantation of magical words,” as the majority points out, it does mandate that the trial court focus on the genuineness of the race-neutral explanation as opposed to its reasonableness. See Murray v. State, 3 So.3d 1108 (Fla.2009). Here, the trial court clearly focused on its reasonableness. The transcript reflects that the trial court stated:

Well, I can see from the face of the questionnaire Ms. Harbin is a law enforcement officer, a corrections officer, and I think that is sufficiently reasonable basis, so I am going to allow the State’s peremptory.

Instead of ruling on whether it believed that the State’s reason for striking Juror Harbin was genuine, the trial court allowed the challenge by concluding that because Juror Harbin was a corrections officer, there was a reasonable basis for striking the juror. The transcript reflects that the trial court never undertook a “genuineness” analysis. This is not the correct application of the third step in the Melbourne analysis. Consequently, I would reverse Alonzo’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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