"[DJefendant [was not] misled into a false sense of security. He knew he was the prime suspect, and the police said nothing to suggest he was permanently immune from further questioning.... [Defendant acknowledged [the officer's] warning that the matter was not concluded.”
How later courts described this case
- "[DJefendant [was not] misled into a false sense of security. He knew he was the prime suspect, and the police said nothing to suggest he was permanently immune from further questioning.... [Defendant acknowledged [the officer's] warning that the matter was not concluded.”
- finding two-day break sufficient
- collecting state and federal cases
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KENNARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the majority’s holding that defendant’s second confession was not obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [ 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1885 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 ] (Edwards), which requires that once a suspect in custody invokes the right to counsel, the police must cease all interrogation unless the suspect initiates further conversation.
Unlike the majority, however, I would not address defendant’s additional claim that even if his second confession was not obtained in violation of Edwards , that confession was involuntary because it was the tainted product of his earlier, custodial confession. Because, as the majority concedes, defendant did not raise this claim below (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1028, fn. 10), he has not preserved it for our review. (People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 511-512 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285 , 49 P.3d 1032 ]; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 339 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 914 P.2d 846 ].) Therefore, I see no need here to apply the voluntariness analysis this court articulated in People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005 [ 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 ].
I would apply the voluntariness analysis of People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pages 1039-1040, only if a defendant claims that a prerelease custodial confession taken in violation of Edwards, supra, 451 U.S. at pages 484-485 [1015 S.Ct. at page 1885], was actually, rather than presumptively, coerced. Only then would it be necessary to apply Bradford to determine whether the defendant’s postrelease confession is the illegal fruit of the earlier coerced confession. Here, defendant has failed to preserve a claim of actual coercion, thus obviating any need for the majority’s discussion of whether his first confession was voluntary.