noting that "other insurance” clauses only become relevant when insurers provide the same level of coverage and that, thus, disputes cannot arise between primary and excess insurers
How later courts described this case
- noting that "other insurance” clauses only become relevant when insurers provide the same level of coverage and that, thus, disputes cannot arise between primary and excess insurers
- noting standardized forms "are often employed industrywide"
- citations, quotations, and punctuation omitted
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BROWN, J.
I reluctantly concur.
Like the majority, I agree that the “evidence of two other product liability claims against Dart [Industries, Inc. (Dart)]—known as the Hinkle and Boone claims—that Commercial Union Insurance Company (Commercial Union) paid under the policy here in issue” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1075) supported the trial court’s finding that the policy provided occurrence-based *1082 coverage by a preponderance of the evidence (id. at pp. 1075-1076). As the majority explains, “the trial court’s conclusion that it was probable that Commercial Union paid the Hinkle and Boone claims to comply with its contractual obligation is a reasonable inference, and as such it must be "upheld on appeal.” (Id. at p. 1076.) Because Commercial Union’s payment of these claims was, by itself, sufficient to support the trial court’s finding, I see no reason to rely on the highly questionable testimony of Charles Pyne in reversing the Court of Appeal’s judgment. (See id. at pp. 1075-1077.)
Although I believe there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s findings under a preponderance of the evidence standard, I would reach a different conclusion under a more stringent standard of proof. Dart’s evidence of the policy’s substance consisted of dubious witness testimony and a few documents hinting at the policy’s terms. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, this evidence was barely sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that the policy covered the claims at issue here by a preponderance of the evidence. If, as the amici curiae contend, the trial court should have applied a clear and convincing evidence standard, I would have affirmed the Court of Appeal’s judgment without hesitation. Unfortunately, as the majority correctly explains, we are precluded from considering whether the trial court should have applied a different “standard or degree of proof’ by the law of the case. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1072, fn. 4.) Therefore, I grudgingly join my colleagues in reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeal.