holding that, in response to the defendant’s argument regarding “the cumulative effect of the oversight of his counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court,” the doctrine of cumulative error “should not apply where ... [the defendant only complains of one error but attributes multiple sources to its cause and where [the defendant had a fair trial”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, in response to the defendant’s argument regarding “the cumulative effect of the oversight of his counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court,” the doctrine of cumulative error “should not apply where ... [the defendant only complains of one error but attributes multiple sources to its cause and where [the defendant had a fair trial”
- stating that when an ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, an 7 appellate court will evaluate the facts that are part of the record, and if the facts 8 necessary to a full determination are not part of the record, an ineffective assistance 9 claim is more properly brought through a habeas corpus petition
- stating that when an 12 ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, we evaluate the facts that 13 are part of the record, and if the facts necessary to a full determination are not part of 14 the record, an ineffective assistance claim is more properly brought through a habeas 15 corpus petition
- stating that when an ineffective 8 assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, we evaluate the facts that are part of 9 the record, and if the facts necessary to a full determination are not part of the record, 10 an ineffective assistance claim is more properly brought through a habeas corpus 11 petition
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FRANCHINI, Justice (dissenting).
{36} I respectfully dissent from Section 11(B) of the majority opinion which concludes that although “Defendant’s counsel ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ ... Defendant [had] not established prejudice sufficient to warrant a new trial.” Majority opinion ¶ 32. I agree with the majority opinion that “Defendant’s counsel ‘fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’ ” Id. However, I believe Defendant suffered prejudice sufficient to warrant a new trial when Ricky’s un-redacted taped confession made reference to Defendant’s involvement with a prior murder.
{37} The district court granted Defendant’s motion in limine, pursuant to Rule 11-403 NMRA 2002, concluding that reference to Defendant’s involvement in another murder “outweighs any probative value for it on the issue of credibility.” Majority opinion ¶ 11. In granting Defendant’s motion, the district court explained:
I am convinced on what I know of your arguments as to what the factual situation here is going to be that credibility is going to be an important issue and truthfulness and therefore the probative value of the armed robbery on the issue of whether Mr. Roybal is being truthful in his testimony, in my opinion outweighs the prejudice of •letting that in, and then I come to the opposite conclusion on the murder conviction.
Id. The district court clearly held in a pretrial ruling that reference to the prior murder conviction was prejudicial to Defendant. In failing to redact the portions of Ricky’s confession that referred to the earlier murder and denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial, the district court essentially reversed its pre-trial ruling to exclude this information.
{38} The risk of prejudice from a jury hearing evidence that a defendant has an earlier criminal conviction is that the jury may infer that because he committed a crime previously, he probably committed the crime for which he is on trial. Rule 11-404(33) NMRA 2002. The risk is greatest when, as here, the crime charged and the prior conviction involve the same offense. Greg Roybal was on trial for murder in the first degree and the jury convicted him of that crime. The evidence admitted here is precisely the kind of evidence that should not be allowed under Rule 403 for the very reason that actual prejudice is unavoidable.
{39} The majority believing otherwise, I respectfully dissent.