The opinion
IRA DE MENT, District Judge,
concurring specially:
For the reasons stated in his opinion, I agree with Judge Carnes that the State of Alabama did not comply with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. In particular, I note that the State failed to clearly identify in its submission letter the changes that it sought to preclear, and, therefore, as required by Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 656 , 111 S.Ct. 2096 , 114 L.Ed.2d 691 (1991), the court has resolved all ambiguities against the submitting authority.
However, I wish to go on record, stating with emphasis, that I agree entirely with Mr. Justice Black’s dissenting opinion 1 in South *979 Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 356 , 86 S.Ct. 803 , 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966). I do not write angrily, but I do write in defense of every United States District Judge who is precluded from reaching the merits of a ease falling within the purview of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act. Not only does § 5 require states to grovel at the feet of the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia, but also it strips southern Federal District Judges of their constitutional power under Article III.
Mr. Justice Black, in his Katzenbach dissent, articulated two grounds upon which he reasoned that § 5 is unconstitutional. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 357 , 86 S.Ct. 803 . First, he argued that § 5 is unconstitutional because it grants the District Court for the District of Columbia the power to approve or reject a state law which has in no way become operative, and this action amounts to the rendering of an advisory opinion, which is specifically prohibited by the Constitution. 2 Id. Mr. Justice Black argued, and I agree, that the appropriate manner by which to protect the principles embodied in the Voting Rights Act is “to invalidate a state law once enacted and operative on the ground that it intrudes into the area of supreme federal power. A federal law which assumes the power to compel the States to submit in advance any proposed legislation they have for approval by federal agents approaches dangerously near to wiping the States out as useful and effective units in the government of our country.” Id. at 360, 86 S.Ct. 803.
Mr. Justice Black also argued that § 5 violated the principles of Federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment. If the provisions of the Constitution “which limit the power of the Federal Government and reserve other power to the States are to mean anything, they mean at least that the States have power to pass laws and amend their constitutions without first sending their officials hundreds of miles away to beg federal authorities to approve them.” Id. at 359, 86 S.Ct. 803 . Mr. Justice Black further articulated his sentiments in Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 595 , 89 S.Ct. 817 , 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969), when he stated, as follows: “I doubt that any of the 13 Colonies would have agreed to our Constitution if they had dreamed that the time might come when they would have to go to a United States Attorney General or a District of Columbia court with hat in hand begging for permission to change their laws.”
Furthermore, thirty-two year's after Mr. Justice Black expressed his concerns with regard to § 5, the difficulties in implementing such a provision have become apparent. Under the current system, states must seek approval for every conceivable change that affects voting, resulting in a horrendous workload for the Attorney General’s Office. For instance, in 1991, the statistics showed that “the Attorney General reviews an average of 17,000 electoral changes each year.... ” Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646, 658 , 111 S.Ct. 2096 , 114 L.Ed.2d 691 (1991). “Because of the acknowledged and anticipated inability of the Justice Department — given limited resources — to investigate independently all changes with respect to voting,” 500 U.S. at 658-59 , 111 S.Ct. 2096 , the Court has heaped upon southern states the additional responsibility to definitively, meticulously, and unambiguously identify the changes submitted for preclearanee.
In the humble opinion of this United States District Judge, the problem of an “overworked Attorney General” can be remedied by returning to the appropriate judicial forum the power to review and remedy voting rights abuses. This would not result in a plethora of litigation in the federal court system because advisory opinions would not be required or rendered. Instead, only those provisions actually implemented and that arguably contained a discriminatory purpose or effect could be subsequently challenged in a local federal court.
*980 The Voting Rights Act represents an enduring symbol of this Nation’s commitment to fairness in our most basic and cherished liberty — the right to vote — and I do not take issue with its remaining provisions; indeed, I support them. Until Congress sees fit to chánge § 5 of the Voting Rights Act, or until the Supreme Court sees fit to revisit its holding in Katzenbach , neither I, nor any other district judge, am at liberty to ignore the Act or the Court’s interpretation of it. Therefore, until such time as Congress repeals § 5, I remain committed to my duty to uphold and apply the law.
. Furthermore, I note that other members of the Court have also expressed similar misgivings. See Dougherty County, Ga. Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32 , 48 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 368 , 58 L.Ed.2d 269 (1978) (citing Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 586 , 89 S.Ct. 817 , 22 L.Ed.2d 1 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting); Holt v. Richmond, 406 U.S. 903 , 92 S.Ct. 1602 , 31 L.Ed.2d 814 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 545 , 93 S.Ct. 1702 , 36 L.Ed.2d 472 (1973) (Powell, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Board of Comm’rs, 435 U.S. 110, 141 , 98 S.Ct. *979 965 , 55 L.Ed.2d 148 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
. Article III of the Constitution limits judicial power to "cases” or "controversies.” "[T]his requirement helps assure that courts will not pass upon abstract, intellectual problems, but will adjudicate concrete, living contests between adversaries.” Federal Election Comm'n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 , 118 S.Ct. 1777, 1784 , 141 L.Ed.2d 10 (1998).