holding that "an error of [improperly striking a juror based on a questionnaire] does not require reversal of the guilt phase verdict”
How later courts described this case
- holding that "an error of [improperly striking a juror based on a questionnaire] does not require reversal of the guilt phase verdict”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MORENO, J., Concurring
Although I concur in the majority opinion, I write separately to address the trial court’s refusal to give Prospective Juror A.S.-P. an opportunity to refute the prosecutor’s assertion that she had lied about her academic credentials. It is true that a defendant “has a right to jurors who are qualified and competent, not to any particular juror.” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 656 [ 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782 , 937 P.2d 213 ].) However, where hearsay allegations are made regarding the truthfulness of a prospective juror, fairness requires that the prospective juror be given an opportunity to respond to those charges—fairness not only to the party *714 objecting to the prospective juror’s excusal on this ground but to the juror herself whose reputation has been sullied by an allegation of dishonesty.
We give seated jurors this opportunity when such charges are made against them. “When the trial court discovers during trial that a juror misrepresented or concealed material information on voir dire tending to show bias, the trial court may discharge the juror if, after examination of the juror, the record discloses reasonable grounds for inferring bias as a ‘demonstrable reality,’ even though the juror continues to deny bias. [Citations.]” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 400 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106 , 821 P.2d 610 ], italics added.) Here, the prosecutor’s allegations against Prospective Juror A.S.-P. went to her credibility, with the implication that, if she had lied about her academic credentials, she may have lied about other matters, and perhaps did so to conceal some bias. In my view, the court should have dealt with this situation in precisely the same manner as if this charge had been made after A.S.-P. had been seated as a juror. She should have been called and examined and given an opportunity to clear her name. It is deeply regrettable that the trial court failed to do so.
Werdegar, J., concurred.
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied September 1, 2010.