holding that plaintiffs could sue in tort when the employer “(1) desired to bring about the worker’s injury or (2) acted with the knowledge that such injury was substantially certain to result from the employer’s conduct.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that plaintiffs could sue in tort when the employer “(1) desired to bring about the worker’s injury or (2) acted with the knowledge that such injury was substantially certain to result from the employer’s conduct.”
- distinguishing between negligence, including gross negligence, and “willful acts that result in intended or unintended harm” and holding that only the latter, as defined by the substantial certainty test, permits recovery beyond that provided for in the Workers’ Compensation Act
- “[A]n actor’s conduct is intentional when the actor has the desire to cause the consequences of the act or when the actor knows the consequences are substantially certain to result from the act.”
- superseded on other grounds by statute
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WINCHESTER, V.C.J.,
with whom LAVENDER, J. and OP ALA, J. join, concurring in part, dissenting in part:
¶ 1 While I concur with the majority’s analysis of the principal employer status issue, I respectfully dissent to their adoption of the “substantial certainty” standard of intent for an employee’s tort claim against an employer. I would adopt the “true intentional tort” test, requiring an intentional or deliberate act by the employer with a desire to bring about the consequences of the act.
¶ 2 The Legislature enacted the workers’ compensation system knowing that workers would be injured while on the job. The issue is how to define an intentional tort, for purposes of workplace injuries. I am guided by three fundamentals. First, the Legislature created an elaborate system with a special court, to address workers’ compensation for workplace injuries. Second, Oklahoma’s Workers’ Compensation Act represents a mutual compromise. Third, the express words of the Legislature provide balance to competing interests. These lead me to conclude that the Legislature intended all but the most egregious circumstances to be covered by this statutory remedy.
¶ 3 This Court has held that when an injured employee received workers’ compensation benefits, those benefits constituted an exclusive remedy that precluded a concurrent tort claim for potential compensatory and punitive damages. Pryse Monument Company v. District Court of Kay County, 1979 OK 71, ¶ 2 , 595 P.2d 435, 436-37 . The instant case involves a deceased employee whose widow received workers’ compensation benefits. The majority’s opinion allows a concurrent tort claim for potential compensatory and punitive damages. Thus, it conflicts with the teaching of Pryse. The Legislature did not intend this outcome when it adopted the Workers’ Compensation Act.
¶ 4 The words chosen by the Legislature, “intentional acts,” indicate a legislative intent to allow tort claims only for “true intentional torts.” The standard set for such cases must be clear, concise and easily ascertainable. Only the “true intentional tort” test provides such an objective standard. The elusive “substantial certainty” test falls far short. A majority of jurisdictions, as cited in the majority opinion, do not utilize “substantial certainty”. Indeed, only a small minority of a dozen states uses that test. The “true intentional tort” test provides the assurance that in those circumstances of egregious conduct, the standard of a true intentional tort under the common law will be met, thereby alerting an employer to anticipate liability in tort and an employee to file such a claim.
¶ 5 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from this portion of the Court’s holding today. I would hold that the “true intentional tort” test is the appropriate standard for determining whether an employer’s conduct falls outside the exclusivity provisions of Oklahoma’s Workers’ Compensation Act.