the precedent had “been law for over a decade,” had been “applied in a number of cases,” and “the clear procedural rule ... is workable, ... as it simply requires the [filing of] a discretionary application to appeal”; “ ‘Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law, particularly in the context of statutory interpretation, where our incorrect decisions are more easily corrected by the democratic process.’ ”
How later courts described this case
- the precedent had “been law for over a decade,” had been “applied in a number of cases,” and “the clear procedural rule ... is workable, ... as it simply requires the [filing of] a discretionary application to appeal”; “ ‘Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law, particularly in the context of statutory interpretation, where our incorrect decisions are more easily corrected by the democratic process.’ ”
- pre-trial habeas case overruling eight prior cases which had disregarded statutory requirements for appeal
- construing the Prison Litigation Reform Act
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NAHMIAS, Justice,
concurring.
Brown asks us to overrule Ray v. Barber, 273 Ga. 856 ( 548 SE2d 283 ) (2001), which held that the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) appeals provision — “[a]ppeals of all actions filed by prisoners shall” proceed by discretionary application, OCGA § 42-12-8 — requires even non-prisoner appellants to file discretionary applications. Id. I agree the case was probably wrongly decided. The linchpin in its reasoning is that “filed by prisoners” only modifies the term “actions,” meaning the provision should be read to say “in all actions filed by prisoners, appeals must come by discretionary application.” Id. But this reading seemingly overlooks the definition of “action” (indeed, Barber never mentions the definition), which only includes “civil lawsuit[s], action[s], or proceeding^] ... filed by a prisoner.” OCGA § 42-12-3 (1) (emphasis added). Because an “action” is, by definition, “filed by a prisoner,” reading “filed by a prisoner” in the appeals provision to only modify “actions” renders the phrase superfluous. The better reading — particularly in view of the PLRA’s stated purpose of minimizing frivolous prisoner filings, OCGA § 42-12-2 — is to interpret “filed by a prisoner” in the appeals provision as describing the entire preceding phrase, “Appeals of any actions.” Thus, contrary to Barber , the appeals provision only requires a discretionary application for an “[a]ppeal[ ] of any action” that is “filed by a prisoner” — in other words, an appeal filed by a prisoner, and only a prisoner.
But stare decisis supports continuing to apply Barber . The decision was not demonstrably wrong, as the appeals provision is not a model of clarity, and applying the definition of “action” to the appeals provision is like fitting a round peg into a slightly oval hole. *726 (For instance, the definition says that an “appeal” counts as an action, meaning the appeals provision applies to “[a]ppeals of any [appeal].”) State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 658 ( 697 SE2d 757 ) (2010). Barber has also been law for over a decade and has been applied in a number of cases. Moreover, the clear procedural rule Barber supplies is workable, id., as it simply requires the State to file a discretionary application to appeal in prisoner actions. This makes little difference: Where the State is not granted discretionary review, it likely would have lost on appeal anyway. Most importantly, the Barber rule is an interpretation of a statute, so the General Assembly is free to change it. Id. (“Stare decisis is an important principle that promotes the rule of law, particularly in the context of statutory interpretation, where our incorrect decisions are more easily corrected by the democratic process.”).
Decided September 12, 2011.
Robert D. James, Jr., District Attorney, Leonora Grant, Deborah D. Wellborn, John S. Melvin, Assistant District Attorneys, for Brown.
Herbert Shafer, J. Converse Bright, for Crawford.
Corey B. Freeman, pro se.
With this understanding, I join the Court’s opinion in full and will continue to apply Barber in future cases.
I am authorized to state that Justice Melton joins in this concurrence.