finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding proffered testimony that did not reveal evidence of bias or motive to lie
How later courts described this case
- finding the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding proffered testimony that did not reveal evidence of bias or motive to lie
- affirming a death sentence where the defendant tortured his former friend to death for a period of eighteen to twenty-four hours, including "choking, being tied up and placed in a closet, being sodomized with a gun and a broomstick, having his scrotum burned, being hit with a heavy vase and a mirror, and generalized beating and cutting," all resulting in over 200 wounds to his body
- "The admission of evidence is within the circuit court's discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion."
- "The elements of accessory after the fact are that the felony has been completed, the accused had knowledge that the principal felon committed the felony, and the accused harbored or assisted the principal."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice PLEICONES.
I concur in the decision to affirm this capital appeal and sentence, but write separately to address both the lesser-included issue and the majority’s suggestion in footnote 8 that we should consider altering our approach to proportionality review.
I agree with the majority that appellant has no constitutional right to a charge on a lesser-related offense. Hopkins v. Reeves, 524 U.S. 88 , 118 S.Ct. 1895 , 141 L.Ed.2d 76 (1998). Rather, the question of a defendant’s right to such a charge is a matter of state law. Id.; see e.g., Sheffield v. State, 64 So.3d 529 (Miss.Ct.App.2011). In my opinion, State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 , 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005), fundamentally altered state law by converting an indictment, which theretofore had been a jurisdictional document, into a mere notice document. Id. at 102-103 , 610 S.E.2d at 500 . Since the notice is directed only to the defendant, in my opinion, it is within his sole prerogative to waive such notice.
Unlike the majority, I find nothing in People v. Birks, 19 Cal.4th 108 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848 , 960 P.2d 1073 (1998) which conflicts with my view that a court may authorize a criminal defendant to request a jury charge on a lesser-related offense. In Birks , the California Supreme Court held it had created a state constitutional problem by extending to the defendant alone the right to request such a charge on state due process grounds, and reversed its earlier decision. If the Court agrees with Birks that it is a constitutional violation to give only one party in a criminal proceeding the right to request such a charge, then the problem can be remedied by overruling Gentiy.
On the merits, I find no reversible error in the circuit court’s decision not to charge the jury on the lesser-related offense of accessory after the fact because such a charge was not supported by the evidence. See State v. Collins, 329 S.C. 23 , 495 S.E.2d 202 (1998) (elements of accessory after the fact explained).
*127 I believe that when S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-25(0(3) (2003) requires us to determine whether the death sentence “is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant,” and to refer to the similar cases that we considered, we should confine our review to only those cases in which a death sentence was imposed. 9 State v. Copeland, 278 S.C. 572 , 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982)(only review of appeals where death sentence was imposed satisfies both state statute and constitution). As Copeland explains, to include in our review cases where a capital sentence was sought but not imposed requires us to speculate on, among other things, the solicitor’s decision-making process, the strength of the State’s case, and/or upon the jurors’ or trial judge’s decision to exercise mercy. Moreover, our reference for proportionality extends only to cases which are appealed, and thus is not truly representative of all cases where the death penalty was or could have been sought. Experience teaches that many of these cases where a lesser sentence is imposed are never appealed.
On the merits, I agree that the death sentence imposed upon appellant is not disproportionate.
For the reasons given above, I concur.
. Like the majority, I have enormous respect for Justice Stevens. If we were to be true to his views on capital sentencing, however, we would join his minority view that imposition of the death sentence violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 , 128 S.Ct. 1520 , 170 L.Ed.2d 420 (2008) (decided the term before he issued his Walker v. Georgia statement). While perhaps Justice Stevens would find our practice of reviewing only other capital cases violative of the Eighth Amendment, the fact remains that proportionality review is a requirement only of state law, not the Constitution. Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 , 104 S.Ct. 871 , 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984).