noting that “blood test results obtained by actual consent, independent of the implied consent statute [section 316.1932], are admissible”
How later courts described this case
- noting that “blood test results obtained by actual consent, independent of the implied consent statute [section 316.1932], are admissible”
- “First, Geiss argues that blood is not ‘property’ within the meaning of the statute. We reject this argument, . . . ‘property’ does not exclude those substances that are naturally produced by the human body.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND CERTIFICATION
PER CURIAM.
We deny the State’s motion for rehearing, but grant its motion to certify the following question pursuant to Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v), as one of great public importance:
DOES SECTION 933.02(2)(a), FLORIDA STATUTES, PRECLUDE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS FROM SECURING A WARRANT FOR A BLOOD DRAW IN MISDEMEANOR CASES INVOLVING AN ALLEGATION THAT A SUSPECT HAS DRIVEN WITH AN UNLAWFUL BLOOD ALCOHOL LEVEL?
REHEARING DENIED; QUESTION CERTIFIED.
LAWSON and COHEN, JJ., concur.
TORPY, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.