stating that “courts are ‘without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power’ ”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “courts are ‘without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power’ ”
- holding that whether an individual is a “claimant” turns on “whether the person is seeking compensation under the NICA Plan”
- pointing out “important principle” that “the NICA Plan limits the remedies as a statutory substitute for common law rights and liabilities”
- describing Plan as “eliminat[ing] and replac[ing]” the “parents’ common law rights to sue on behalf of their children for medical malpractice” with “an administrative remedy”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CANADY, C.J.,
dissenting.
Because I conclude that the decision of the First District in St. Vincent’s Medical Center, Inc. v. Bennett, 27 So.Sd 65 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), is not in express and direct conflict with the Fifth District’s decision in Orlando Regional Healthcare System, Inc. v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological, 997 So.2d 426 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), I would discharge this case.
The First District’s holding in Bennett turned on its conclusion that the statutory scheme does “not preclude coverage if neurological damage becomes manifest” at a date later than “labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery peri *848 od.” 27 So.3d at 70. Nothing in Orlando Regional or any other case conflicts with this holding.
The asserted conflict between Orlando Regional and Bennett is based on dicta in Bennett concerning the meaning of the phrase “immediate postdelivery period in a hospital.” 27 So.3d at 70. Although the discussion of this point in Bennett might plausibly be viewed as an alternative holding of the case, it is more reasonable to understand the cursory discussion on this point as dicta. The discussion is prefaced by a phrase — “even if’ — signaling comments on a hypothetical circumstance. Id.
In any event, Orlando Regional simply decided that under the circumstances of that case, “no reasonable interpretation for the phrase ‘resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period’ ” justified excluding the injury suffered by the infant there. 997 So.2d at 431 . The Orlando Regional court did not articulate a comprehensive rule for limiting the scope of “the immediate postdelivery period” but instead recognized that “the application of this definition in determining plan compensability must be applied on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 430 .
I therefore dissent.