concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting DNA expert’s testimony regarding DNA evidence where she based her opinion on data obtained from electronic equipment and the work of other DNA analysists
How later courts described this case
- concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting DNA expert’s testimony regarding DNA evidence where she based her opinion on data obtained from electronic equipment and the work of other DNA analysists
- holding that expert “testimony about Cellmark’s report was not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted” but, “rather, to show the underlying facts and data [the expert] used before rendering” her opinion
- observing that in Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186 (1981), the Illinois Supreme Court had adopted the identical Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
- observing that, in 1981, the Illinois Supreme Court had adopted the identical Rule 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE BURKE, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I join the part of Justice Freeman’s special concurrence that concludes that the circuit court abused its discretion in admitting Lambatos’ testimony. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s resolution of the consecutive-sentencing issue. The defendant was sentenced to two concurrent natural-life terms for the aggravated criminal sexual assault counts and a concurrent 15-year term for aggravated robbery. Defendant received an additional 60-year prison term for aggravated kidnapping, to be served consecutively to the natural-life terms. The appellate court held, pursuant to our decision in People v. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d 148 (2006), that a term of years could not be served consecutively to a term of natural life. Accordingly, the court vacated that portion of the circuit court’s order imposing consecutive sentences and modified defendant’s sentence to impose concurrent sentences. 385 Ill. App. 3d at 371. The majority now reverses the appellate court. Relying on People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490 (2010), which overruled Palmer on this point, the majority in the case at bar has held that a sentence consecutive to a natural-life sentence was proper. For the same reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in Petrenko, I do not believe that good cause exists to overrule Palmer. Therefore, I would affirm the appellate court below on the consecutive-sentencing issue.