Opinion

In the Interest of Striegler

  • 915 S.W.2d 629
  • 1996 WL 38199
Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 7th District (Amarillo)
Filed
Feb 28, 1996
Status
Published
Author
Quinn
On the bench
Reynolds, Boyd, Quinn
Cited by
89 cases

declining to extend the requirements of the predecessor statute “to orders which deny motions to modify child support and, effectively, order payment of child support as set out in a prior order”

How later courts described this case

  • declining to extend the requirements of the predecessor statute “to orders which deny motions to modify child support and, effectively, order payment of child support as set out in a prior order”
  • holding trial court can consider obligor’s earning potential
  • discussing Tamez and citing Ex parte Helms, 259 S.W.2d 184, 188 (Tex. 1953); Exparte Wagner, 905 S.W.2d at 803

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

QUINN, Justice,

concurring.

I fully agree with the majority’s discussion and resolution of points one through eleven. However, I concur in Justice Boyd’s disposition of point twelve, but not the reasoning underlying it.

The objection lodged by Allan Striegler concerned the attorney’s ability to testify as an expert. Nothing was said of his ability to speak to facts as a fact witness. Moreover, the trial court expressly restricted him to so testifying. Any comment falling within the realm of opinion, expert or lay, would be ignored, according to the court.

Furthermore, the evidence actually uttered established the existence of an attorney/client relationship between Saundra Lou Striegler Ford and the witness, the number of hours expended by the witness in securing relief for his client, and the hourly rate charged that client. These topics involved items of fact, not expert or lay opinion. In view of the objection uttered and the evidence presented, I conclude that the trial *645 judge acted appropriately in admitting the testimony.

To the extent that nothing was said regarding the reasonableness of the fees or the absence of evidence indicating that the fees were reasonable, I also conclude that Strie-gler waived complaint thereto. Neither his point of error nor argument mentions that element or otherwise complains of unreasonableness. And, though we may have to construe points liberally, we may not, sua sponte, raise argument to secure reversal.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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