holding the popular name was misleading thus the proposed amendment was ineligible for consideration at the election regardless of the effects of the ballot title
How later courts described this case
- holding the popular name was misleading thus the proposed amendment was ineligible for consideration at the election regardless of the effects of the ballot title
- striking the popular name "Unborn Child Amendment" as partisan because "the ballot name . . . gives the voters only the impression the proponents of the amendment want them to have"
- “[T]he popular name of the proposed amendment constitutes a partisan coloring of the ballot . . . .”
- “The popular name is a clear-cut example of the partisan coloring of ballots which we have uniformly condemned in our decisions holding that a ballot[’s popular] name must be fair and impartial.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Webb Hubbell, Chief Justice, dissenting. The only issue before us is whether Amendment 65’s ballot title and popular name are (1) intelligible, (2) honest, and (3) impartial. Leigh v. Hall, 232 Ark. 558 , 339 S.W.2d 104 (1960). The petitioner does not raise the constitutionality of the proposed amendment, so that issue cannot be considered.
The ballot title is an almost verbatim reproduction of the amendment and is not misleading. The popular name “Unborn Child Amendment” need not have the same detailed information as is required for the ballot title. Although many people oppose the use of the term “unborn child,” since Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the term is understood and widely used. Several of our surrounding states use “unborn child” in their abortion statutes and define unborn child as the entity from conception to birth. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 188.015 ; Okla. Stat. 6351-730. The popular name, although certainly used to provoke emotion, is intelligible.
We should always heistate to remove any initiated act from the ballot. Our function is to unify, not fracture, to set limits and define boundaries within which the political process can operate. We cannot ordain specific solutions to vexatious, divisive, and perhaps insoluble problems of public policy. Unless the people stray beyond the bounds of reasonable constitutional interpretation, we should not hurl our constitutional thunderbolts.