officer’s knowledge that the defendant was a “transient” and therefore he 16 “moved about” did not justify dispensing with the warrant requirement, but arrest was legal because officer discovered defendant hiding on a freight train in another town, which was conduct consistent with escaping
How later courts described this case
- officer’s knowledge that the defendant was a “transient” and therefore he 16 “moved about” did not justify dispensing with the warrant requirement, but arrest was legal because officer discovered defendant hiding on a freight train in another town, which was conduct consistent with escaping
- officer's knowledge that the defendant was a "transient" and therefore he "moved about" did not justify dispensing with the warrant requirement, but arrest was legal because officer discovered defendant hiding on a freight train in another town, which was conduct consistent with escaping
- overruled on another ground in Black v. State, 739 S.W.2d 240, 245 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled — as noted by a later court
Although six judges joined the holding that Black’s arrest was illegal, two of those six specifically dissented to the plurality holding: "To the extent that Bain and Dodson stand for the proposition that there can never be a pretext arrest when the defendant actually violated the traffic laws, they are overruled.
in partmedium confidence
The opinion
CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Dodson v. State, 646 S.W.2d 177 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) examines a stop of a motor vehicle and concludes:
“We find that the record before us supports the trial court’s finding that the officers stopped appellant’s vehicle in a lawful manner and not upon a ‘mere pretext.’ ”
Id., at 185 . That finding simply cannot be reasonably translated into what the majority opinion says about the detention of appellant in this cause, viz:
“Even if Coulson had arrested appellant for trespassing as a pretext in order to determine if appellant was indeed the suspect he was looking for, this is allowable under our case law.” (p.-) 1
That gratuitous statement pales in significance to the respects in which the majority utilizes the unfortunate case of Woodward v. State, 668 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Cr.App.1982). Rather than extending the two judge opinion in Woodward , 2 the Court should reject the notion that “collective law enforcement personnel” may reasonably believe some factual aspect of the law of arrest. That theory releases an arresting officer from responsibility for his actions, and enables an appellate court to make its own de novo determination as to their justification — just as is done here.
I respectfully dissent to further emasculation of constitutional and statutory provisions intended and designed for reasonable protection of our citizenry.
. Emphasis added by Judge Tom Davis. All other emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.
. The opinion written on rehearing by Judge W.C. Davis in Woodward which is apparently the one relied on by Judge Tom Davis here, was joined only by Judge Miller. Thus, it cannot be even characterized as a "plurality” opinion.