rejecting the Court of Appeals test for assessing the taxability of religious publications “based on whether the particular book or activity adhered to the ‘doctrine and practice’ or ‘religious faith’ of the respective denominations” in favor of a test that did not turn upon an assessment of religious doctrine
How later courts described this case
- rejecting the Court of Appeals test for assessing the taxability of religious publications “based on whether the particular book or activity adhered to the ‘doctrine and practice’ or ‘religious faith’ of the respective denominations” in favor of a test that did not turn upon an assessment of religious doctrine
- dollar volume of exempt activity as compared with the entire volume of business done
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
W. M. LEECH, Special Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the results reached in the opinion written by Chief Justice DYER. I base this opinion primarily upon the decision in M. E. Church, South v. Hinton, 92 Tenn. 188 , 21 S.W. 321 (1893); the fact that the operation of these facilities has not changed since the date of the Hinton decision; and the fact that the legislature has not taken any action that would change the statutory construction in Hinton, of what constitutes religious purposes.
The record in the instant cases shows that the method of operation of these two institutions has not changed over the years. Nevertheless, the tax assessor’s and the Metropolitan Government’s principal argument is that these institutions have become too rich and powerful, thus the courts should no longer allow these exemptions which heretofore have been granted. If this allegation is true, it is a question for the legislature and not the courts. This question was similarly raised. in Hinton and it will hereinafter be discussed in further detail.
To begin the analysis of this question, it should be recognized that for many years the property of these religious institutions has been treated as tax exempt, thus a sud *527 den departure from that recognition by the taxing authorities, without legislative action, would in my opinion be inequitable and contrary to this State’s public policy. I base this opinion, in part, upon the language used in Estrin v. Moss, 221 Tenn. 657 , 430 S.W.2d 345 (1968), wherein this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Chat-tin, said:
“It is a familiar rule of statutory construction, where a statute of doubtful meaning and subject to construction, that administrative interpretations, especially where they are unchallenged over a long period of time, are accorded persuasive weight by the court and will usually he followed unless palpably erroneous.” (Emphasis added).
The foregoing statement is further supported by Gallagher v. Butler, 214 Tenn. 129 , 378 S.W.2d 161 (1963). Therein, the Court speaking through Mr. Justice White, quoted from New England Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Reece, 169 Tenn. 84 , 83 S.W.2d 238 (1935) as follows:
“This rule has been recognized in many of our cases and has found frequent application in tax controversies in which it has been announced that the construction placed upon a statute by the officers whose duty it is to execute that statute is entitled to great consideration When such an administrative construction persists for a long period, without legislative action, the court is particularly loath to disturb that construction.” (Emphasis added).
In addition to the foregoing a careful reading of Hinton discloses that all of the arguments advanced by the tax assessor and Metro in the instant cases were therein presented and rejected. It is true that Hinton is an old case, but that alone does not destroy its validity.
In these more recent cases, it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile this Court’s holdings in regard to the tax exempt status of religious, educational, and charitable institutions. This is especially true of Nashville v. State Board of Equalization, 219 Tenn. 587 , 360 S.W.2d 458 (1961), and Peabody College v. State Board of Equalization, 219 Tenn. 123 , 407 S.W.2d 443 (1966). Consequently, I would return to the construction placed upon the statute and charters in Hinton and leave to the legislature the making of any changes which might appear to be necessary as a result of changing times and circumstances, as to what constitutes “exclusively” or “purely” religious purposes.
The following statement from Hinton is, in the main, applicable to the issues in these cases:
“The purposes of this corporation are twofold, — to publish and distribute books, etc., and therefrom to raise money to support these most worthy objects of Christian charity. We need not inquire which is the primary and which the secondary purpose. Both are indissolubly interwoven in the foundation of this institution, and the former is but a means of accomplishing the latter.
“Even if we conceded that the work done could not strictly be called religious, still the proceeds therefrom are wholly devoted to the charitable purposes contemplated in the creation of the institution, and the work done cannot be considered immoral, or at variance with the religious feature of the institution.
“It is said there are dangers to society likely to result in so holding; that a line must be drawn somewhere; that such institutions may become too rich and powerful, and menace society. In answer to this, we say the field of charity is large, and is not likely to be overcrowded, unless some element of personal gain enters into the enterprise. Besides, no fund can ever accumulate from the operation of this institution, as the income, so soon as earned, is impressed with a direct trust in favor of this charity, which can be enforced at once; and again, if necessary, the legislature can, if *528 deemed important, limit the exemption in amount.
“It is said, also, that evil-minded persons may adopt the plan of obtaining charters for religious and charitable purposes in order to enrich themselves. A sufficient answer to this is that it is agreed in this case that the proceeds have all the while been properly applied. If they are diverted to other purposes, then will he the time to lay the hand of the law upon it, and not only make it contribute to the common burden of taxation, but force it, it may be, to surrender its charter, used as a cloak for such fraudulent purposes.” (Emphasis added).
Conceding that some of the more recent cases, especially Nashville v. State Board of Equalization, supra, have departed from the liberal construction applied in Hinton, others more recent, especially Peabody College v. State Board of Equalization, supra, have returned to a liberal construction, it is therefore obvious that the statute is ambiguous, and therefore susceptible to more than one interpretation. This being the case, that construction that is just and equitable should be applied. I think the opinion of the Chief Justice is just and equitable and I, therefore, concur. The minority opinion would be equivalent to repealing all the exemptions of most charitable and religious institutions and would be contrary to the legislative intent.