holding that a juror is biased as a matter of law if he unequivocally expresses an inability to consider five years probation as possible punishment for the lesser-included State’s Brief Page 4 offense of murder in a capital-murder trial
How later courts described this case
- holding that a juror is biased as a matter of law if he unequivocally expresses an inability to consider five years probation as possible punishment for the lesser-included State’s Brief Page 4 offense of murder in a capital-murder trial
- noting that appellate courts look beyond individual statements in isolation when reviewing determination of bias
- evidence of defendant's low I.Q., though relevant to special issues, did not preclude jury from finding that he acted deliberately or from making an affirmative finding of future dangerousness
- ÂUnder Batson, the totality of the circumstances of the particular case must be examined to determine whether an inference of misconduct by the state has been established.Â
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
Adhering to my views that I set out in the dissenting opinion that I filed on original submission, I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion’s holding that Toby Lynn Williams, appellant, is precluded from raising the Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), issue for the first time on appeal because he failed to complain in the trial court when the jury that convicted him and answered the special issues in the affirmative, which assured him to be sentenced by the trial judge to a premature death, was selected. Also see the dissenting opinion that I filed in Mathews v. State, 768 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (On appellant’s motion for rehearing). (delivered this date).
The majority opinion so holds notwithstanding the fact that at that time neither Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), nor its principle that a prosecuting attorney may not blatantly exercise his peremptory strikes on an individual because of his or her race was extant.
*543 Notwithstanding that appellant’s trial occurred prior to when Batson was decided, appellant was entitled to receive the benefits of Batson v. Kentucky because it was decided when his case was on appeal. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 107 S.Ct. 708 , 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987).