finding egregious harm when the erroneous charge instructed the jury of the complete opposite of the correct law on legality' of stops and admissibility of evidence when that law was the “crux” of appellant’s defense
How later courts described this case
- finding egregious harm when the erroneous charge instructed the jury of the complete opposite of the correct law on legality' of stops and admissibility of evidence when that law was the “crux” of appellant’s defense
- holding that “[i]t is not sufficient for the jury to receive an abstract instruction of the law” and holding in favor of egregious harm when the application paragraph incorrectly stated the law
- stating that in the egregious-harm analysis, we consider the charge, the evidence, arguments of counsel, and any other relevant information revealed by the trial record as a whole
- observing that charge error appearing in the application portion of a jury charge is especially egregious because, in contrast to the abstract portion, the application portion of the jury charge is the section that actually authorizes the jury to act
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Gelinas, James Henry, 2013 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 756 (2013)
922 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Gelinas v. State, 398 S.W.3d 703, 710
Distinguished
Distinguished by Sanchez, Orlando (2012)
Hutch, therefore, is inapplicable.
The opinion
KELLER, Judge,
dissenting.
To understand why the majority is wrong, one need only read the jury charge. Upon doing so it is apparent that, while the charge is erroneous, it is not erroneous in the way that the majority says it is.
The charge erroneously instructed the jury to disregard the officer’s testimony if the jury believed that appellant was not wearing his seat belt. Thus, had the jury believed that appellant was not wearing his seat belt, and followed the instruction, the jury would have disregarded the testimony and acquitted appellant.
The charge did not instruct the jury as to the converse of the above. The charge did not tell the jury what to do if it believed that appellant was wearing his seat belt. In other words, the jury charge authorized acquittal on the wrong basis, but did not authorize conviction on the wrong basis. Thus, the majority is wrong when it says that the erroneous instruction “authorized the stop if appellant was wearing a seat belt.” Op. 172.
As the majority says, there is an appellate presumption that the jury followed the court’s charge absent evidence to the contrary. Op. 172. The majority “find[s] noth- *175 mg to indicate the jury did not follow the trial judge’s erroneous instruction.” Op. 173. But we know that the juxy did not follow the erroneous part of the instruction—to do so would have resulted in acquittal. The majority says, “[T]he only way the jury could have convicted was by using illegally obtained evidence.” In fact, the only way the jury could have convicted was by disregarding the erroneous instruction and acting in accord with the rest of the jury charge and the jury arguments.
The Court of Appeals correctly applied the analysis set out in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (op. on rehearing) and reached a conclusion “within a reasonable zone of disagreement.” Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (op. on rehearing). I would affirm the judgments of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
McCORMICK, P.J., and WHITE and MANSFIELD, JJ., join.