rejecting argument that “lack of sufficient personnel” in district attorney’s office qualified as an exceptional circumstance under the former Speedy Trial Act
How later courts described this case
- rejecting argument that “lack of sufficient personnel” in district attorney’s office qualified as an exceptional circumstance under the former Speedy Trial Act
- "Since both indictments involve the same offense, the motion for continuance, if good, carries forward from the first indictment to the second indictment."
- delay caused by overburdened district attorney’s office not “exceptional circumstance”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
W.C. DAVIS, Judge,
dissenting.
Article 32A.02, § 4(10) states:
Sec. 4. In computing the time by which the State must be ready for trial, the following period shall be excluded ...
(10) any other reasonable period of delay that is justified by exceptional circumstances.
*334 Even though, as is pointed out in Lloyd v. State, 665 S.W.2d 472 (Tex.Cr.App.1984), most cases dealing with § 4(10) have fallen into the category of court delays, i.e., overcrowded dockets, absence of a material witness due to hospitalization, etc., surely some prosecutorial delays will constitute . exceptional circumstances. Article 32A.02 clearly addresses itself to prosecutorial delays rather than those occasioned by the judicial process as a whole. Barfield v. State, 586 S.W.2d 538 (Tex.Cr.App.1979). The language in § 4(10) does not indicate such a limitation, but seems to be a general catch-all designed to prevent dismissals like the one given today.
The record reflects that during the week that appellant’s case was originally set for trial there were 47 other criminal cases pending in two district courts. Further, the prosecutor’s office had two vacancies facing her while trying to prepare for criminal trials. Based on these circumstances the State’s motion for continuance was granted. The majority has determined such circumstances are not “exceptional” under the statute. Prosecutors beware! If the circumstances evidenced by the instant case are not “exceptional,” it will be the rare case indeed where they are held to be. For this reason I dissent from the majority opinion.
WHITE, J., joins this dissent.