The opinion
Korsmo, J.
¶23 (dissenting) — The veteran officer believed the encounter he observed suggested the possibility of solicitation of prostitution. The veteran trial judge agreed. Since the record adequately supports the basis for the stop, the convictions should be affirmed. I respectfully dissent.
¶24 As noted by the majority, Washington applies the articulable suspicion standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 , 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to investigative stops *594 implicating the protections of article I, section 7 of our state constitution. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1, 4-6 , 726 P.2d 445 (1986). When an officer can articulate the basis for believing possible criminal activity is afoot, a brief detention to investigate is permissible. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 . The test is whether the facts known to the officer show “a substantial possibility that criminal conduct has occurred or is about to occur.” Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d at 6 . Immediately after adopting that test, the Kennedy court stated, ‘When the activity is consistent with criminal activity, although also consistent with noncriminal activity, it may justify a brief detention.” Id.
¶25 State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57 , 239 P.3d 573 (2010), does not change those standards. There the court concluded that a brief middle-of-the-night stop at a suspected drug house did not supply articulable suspicion of wrongdoing. Id. at 64-65. There was no indication that Mr. Doughty was a known drug user or that he typically purchased drugs from the residence, nor was there any evidence that he entered the house or even spoke to anyone there. Id. at 64. Under these facts, the court concluded that no crime had been articulated. Id. at 64-65. 2 That is not the situation here.
¶26 More relevant is United States v. Luqman, 522 F.3d 613 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1020 (2008). There a pair of veteran Akron police officers, one of whom had spent two months investigating prostitution as a member of the vice squad, saw the defendant stop his truck in the lane of travel and talk to a woman who had been standing on the street comer. When the officers pulled in behind the truck, the woman ran back to the sidewalk. The driver started to pull forward and the officers activated their lights. Id. at 615. The officers contacted the driver, discovered that his license was suspended, and arrested him. A handgun was *595 discovered and charges were filed. Id. After a motion to suppress was denied, the defendant was convicted and appealed. Id. at 615-616.
¶27 The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the officers had articulated sufficient suspicion to justify the initial Terry stop. Specifically, the driver had stopped his car in the lane of travel, in an area known for prostitution, to talk to a woman, who then left when the police approached. Id. at 617.
¶28 This case is in a nearly identical fact pattern. Mr. Diluzio stopped his car in the driving lane 3 of east Sprague Avenue, a notorious Spokane prostitution area. 4 It was late on a Sunday evening, the businesses were closed, there was no bus stop nearby, and there were no residences in the neighborhood. Mr. Diluzio was talking through the window to a female who then got into his passenger seat. As in Luqman , the officer observing this behavior had also worked special prostitution details in the past and had made prostitution arrests in this area. Unsurprisingly, the officer believed prostitution might be occurring here. While the conversation may have been innocent, that is not the test. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d at 6 . Instead, the question is whether these circumstances suggested criminal behavior. Id. Unlike Doughty, where the officer could articulate only the apparently innocent conduct of a person stopping at a house, here the officer’s observations suggested that solicitation of prostitution was occurring.
¶29 As did the Sixth Circuit, we should be affirming. The officer articulated specific facts that led him to believe a crime might be occurring. That is all that Terry, Kennedy, or Doughty requires.
¶30 I would affirm.
Review denied at 173 Wn.2d 1002 (2011).
In essence, Doughty is simply an application of the rule that being in a “high crime area” is not enough to justify a Terry stop to a suspected drug house. See State v. Richardson, 64 Wn. App. 693, 697 , 825 P.2d 754 (1992), discussed in the majority opinion.
An act that violates Spokane Municipal Code 16A.61.560(A): “Except as specifically allowed by City ordinance or permit, no person may stop, park, or leave standing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended, upon the roadway.”
See State v. Yates, 161 Wn.2d 714, 729 , 168 P.3d 359 (2007), cert. denied, 554 U.S. 922 (2008).