stating that the "crucial point" is "whether or not in the earlier litigation the representative of the government had authority to represent its interests in a final adjudication of the issue in controversy," and concluding that "[t]he Department of Public Safety does not have such general authority to represent the interests of prosecutors"
How later courts described this case
- stating that the "crucial point" is "whether or not in the earlier litigation the representative of the government had authority to represent its interests in a final adjudication of the issue in controversy," and concluding that "[t]he Department of Public Safety does not have such general authority to represent the interests of prosecutors"
- finding Department of Public Safety and District Attorney's Office not the same parties; thus, collateral estoppel did not bar District Attorney from litigating the issue of probable cause at a suppression hearing even though that same issue was previously litigated at the revocation-of-driver's-license hearing
- stating that, in context of reviewing trial court order granting motion to suppress “we cannot limit our review of the [trial] court’s ruling to the ground upon which it relied. We must review the record to determine if there is any valid basis upon which to affirm the county criminal court’s ruling”
- stating that the Texas Department of Public Safety and the Dallas County District Attorney are not the same parties, but then assuming that they are the same parties, and going on to decide against appellant on other grounds
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BAIRD, Judge,
dissenting to denial of appellee’s motion for rehearing.
The holding on original submission, namely that the State is not the State, is patently absurd. Nevertheless, that holding garnered five votes, the fifth of which was Judge Tom Price. Today, Judge Price recognizes the absurdity of that holding and states that he should have joined Judge Mansfield and concurred only in the judgment. Post at 206 (Price dissenting to denial of appellee’s motion for rehearing). Therefore, only a plurality of this ‘ Court (McCormick, Keller, Holland, and Womack, JJ.) favors the holding on original submission. However, that plurality holding stands in direct conflict with State v. Aguilar, where a majority held an administrative license revocation (ALR) proceeding can have collateral estoppel affect in a later criminal proceeding. 947 S.W.2d 257, 259 (Tex.Cr.App.1997). This conflict was made known on original submission, Ante at 190 (Baird, J., dissenting), but the majority failed to distinguish, mention or even cite Aguilar.
This Court should issue opinions which clarify the law, not confuse it. What is the trial judge to do when defense counsel cites Aguilar in support of his motion to suppress and the State counters that argument by citing Brabson ?
The only reason to deny rehearing is to permit the State to win. As I noted in my original dissent, this ease is a model of result oriented jurisprudence. Ante, at 191. We should grant rehearing, withdraw our earlier *203 opinion and, consistent with Aguilar, hold that an ALR proceeding can have collateral estoppel affect. ■ Because a majority of this Court fails in its duty to follow established precedent and respect the rule of law, I dissent.