conveyance specifically limiting the use of property for railroad purposes caused deed to convey only an easement, and fact deed contained reverter clause, “did nothing more than fix the period of nonuser [sic] which would cause the interest of the railroad in the property to terminate”
How later courts described this case
- conveyance specifically limiting the use of property for railroad purposes caused deed to convey only an easement, and fact deed contained reverter clause, “did nothing more than fix the period of nonuser [sic] which would cause the interest of the railroad in the property to terminate”
- discussing the legislative policy established in Missouri arising from factors peculiar to railroads
- railroad depot within scope of easement
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HENLEY, Judge
(concurring).
While I dissented from the majority opinion in Division, I have concluded, since transfer of the case to Banc, to concur for the following reasons. The subsequent conveyance by Quinn of the adjacent property raises a “presumption of grant” of the underlying fee in the depot property in the absence of words in that conveyance showing a different intention. Grant v. Moon, 128 Mo. 43 , 30 S.W. 328 ; Snoddy v. Bolen, et al., 122 Mo. 479 , 25 S.W. 932 , 24 L.R.A. 507 ; Brown v. Weare, 348 Mo. 135 , 152 S.W.2d 649, 654-655 [14-15], 136 A.L.R. 286 . See also 9 University of Kansas City Law Review 113. The attempt by Quinn in the fourth “condition” of his deed of April 9, 1901, to cause the “land” to “revert” to him upon abandonment of the easement was ineffective as against Quinn’s subsequent deeds conveying the adjoining land since the latter expressed no intent to retain the underlying fee in the easement property. See Snoddy v. Bolen, et al., supra, 25 S.W. l.c. 934, which I consider analogous and controlling as to the effect of the fourth “condition.” Snoddy involved conflicting claims to minerals under half of a public street. In that case plaintiff’s remote grantor by an instrument dedicating the street to public use retained the fee to the minerals in place thereunder and thereafter conveyed lots adjoining one side of the street to defendants’ remote grantors by deeds which made no mention of the mineral rights retained. The court affirmed a judgment for defendants, holding that since the deeds to the lots expressed no contrary intention by exception or reservation the minerals passed to defendants who had, by deeds describing the lots only, acquired the fee to the center of the street. See also Prewitt, et al. v. Whittaker, et al., Mo., 432 S.W.2d 240 , 243 et seq., [2-3],