in addressing any state tax challenged on commerce clause grounds, a court must apply the four-prong test set forth in Complete Auto Transit
How later courts described this case
- in addressing any state tax challenged on commerce clause grounds, a court must apply the four-prong test set forth in Complete Auto Transit
- Upholding the constitutionality of Arkansas’ Highway Use Equalization tax
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Rehearing Opinion delivered May 27, 1986
Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice. The appellants filed a petition for rehearing contending in part that we erred by failing to address the question of whether the HUE tax violates the privileges and immunities clause of the United States Constitution.
In the opinion, we incorrectly found the appellants lacked standing to raise this argument since all of the named plaintiff's are corporations and the privileges and immunities clause is inapplicable to corporations.
Appellants maintain in their petition that the parties had stipulated that there were two individuals named in the complaint as representative appellants who were so named for the purpose of raising this issue. The respondent states that this is so. Accordingly, we admit error and address this question on its merits.
The privileges and immunities clause provides:
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities in the Several States.
The United States Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he primary purpose of this clause . . . was to help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States. It was designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy.” Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948); see also Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1868); Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1870). In Ward v. Maryland, the Supreme Court stated:
Beyond doubt those words are words of very comprehensive meaning, but it will be sufficient to say that the Clause plainly and unmistakably secures and protects the rights of a citizen of one State to pass into any other State of the Union for the purpose of engaging in lawful commerce, trade, or business without molestation . . . and to be exempt from any higher taxes or excises than are imposed by the State upon its own citizens.
Ward at p. 430 .
The HUE tax does not violate the privileges and immunities clause. We have already held that the tax is facially neutral, applying equally to both Arkansas base-registered trucks as well as to non-Arkansas base-registered vehicles. Further, the Arkansas and non-Arkansas based trucks share the same opportunity of carrying the higher weights. Therefore, there is no classification made between citizens of one state as opposed to citizens of another state.
The second argument by petitioners is that the court was incorrect in finding that the tax did not discriminate against non-Arkansas based trucks. Petitioners cite two Vermont cases which have been decided since the arguments were presented in this appeal. We are obviously not bound by the decisions of a Vermont court. Furthermore, in those cases, the court found that the relevant statutes imposed different requirements on out-of-state operators. Here, the HUE tax applies equally to all operators and any disparity in amounts results from the number of miles traveled by their trucks. The rest of petitioners’ argument on this issue and their final contention are essentially restatements of their original brief and thus not proper for rehearing. Sup. Ct. R. 20(g).
Rehearing denied.
Purtle, J., not participating. Hickman, J., would grant rehearing.