Opinion

Barnett v. Barnett

  • 985 S.W.2d 520
  • 1998 WL 918496
Court
Texas Court of Appeals, 1st District (Houston)
Filed
Feb 18, 1999
Status
Published
Author
Mirabal
On the bench
Mirabal, O'Connor, Nuchia
Cited by
22 cases
Authority
More cited than 10.8%

Reversed in part, on other grounds by Barnett v. Barnett, 67 S.W.3d 107 (2002)

ACosts and attorney=s fees are assessed against the personal representative of an estate because of the inequities inherent in penalizing the estate when the representative neglects his or her duty.@

How later courts described this case

  • ACosts and attorney=s fees are assessed against the personal representative of an estate because of the inequities inherent in penalizing the estate when the representative neglects his or her duty.@
  • “Costs and attorney’s fees are assessed against the personal representative of an estate because of the inequities inherent in penalizing the estate when the representative neglects his or her duty.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

MIRABAL, Justice,

dissenting.

I disagree with the majority’s resolution of five out of eleven points raised in this appeal. Accordingly, I dissent.

ERISA Plan Policies

As the majority opinion states, all parties agree that the three life insurance policies covering the deceased through his employment at Houston Industries, Inc. were part of an ERISA 1 regulated employee benefit plan. Under ERISA, a plan administrator is required to administer the plan “in accordance with the plan documents and instruments governing the plan.” 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (a)(1)(D). The uncontroverted summary judgment evidence shows that the ERISA plan documents direct that proceeds of plan life insurance policies are payable to the beneficiary designated by the employee.

ERISA supersedes “any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan” covered by the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (a). Because designation of beneficiaries plainly relates to ERISA plans, state law is superseded. Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1321, 1325 (5th Cir.1994); Emmens v. Johnson, 923 S.W.2d 705, 707 (Tex.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, writ denied). Consequently, even if Texas law would, but for ERISA, mandate a different distribution, ERISA preemption requires us to follow federal law. See Id. Thus, because ERISA supersedes state law in the area of beneficiary designation, the Wife’s claim for benefits based on state community property law is without merit.

Clearly, if the deceased had designated an individual as the beneficiary of his ERISA plan life insurance policies, that individual would be entitled to the life insurance proceeds free and clear of the Wife’s state law claims. Here, the deceased designated his estate as the beneficiary; 2 thus, his estate is entitled to the life insurance proceeds, which are to be distributed in accordance with the deceased’s will. 3 Community property law does not come into play.

Accordingly, the trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment based *536 on ERISA. I would overrule points of error one, two, and four.

Family Allowance

In points of error five and six, the Wife asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her application for a family allowance and that the order of denial was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

The Texas Probate Code provides for a family allowance, in appropriate cases, for the support of the surviving spouse and minor children of the deceased during the first year after the deceased’s death. Tex.PROB. Code AnN. § 286 (Vernon 1998). The amount of the allowance for the widow’s and children’s support is addressed to the trial court’s discretion. San Angelo Nat. Bank v. Wright, 66 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex.Civ.App.— Austin 1934, writ ref'd). The widow’s allowance must be made with reference to the widow’s necessities measured by her condition in life and by what she had been accustomed to during the lifetime of the husband. Tex.PROB.Code Ann. § 287 (Vernon 1980); Kennedy v. Draper, 575 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex.Civ.App. — Waco 1978, no writ).

The evidence showed that, at the time of the deceased’s death, he and the Wife had been living apart for over a year; the Wife had neither sought nor received from the deceased any support for at least a year prior to his death; 4 the Wife was gainfully employed; and during the 12 months after the deceased’s death, the Wife had received cash payments in excess of $50,000, yet her living expenses during that time amounted to $28,440. The evidence clearly supported the trial court’s conclusion that the wife “failed to prove any necessity for a family allowance.”

I would overrule points of error five and six.

I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.

. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S .C. §§ 1001, et seq.

. I note that, from the beginning of his employment at Houston Industries, Inc., the deceased had designated his estate as the beneficiary under each of his life insurance policies. There was no change of beneficiary designation at any time.

.As noted by the majority opinion, the deceased’s mother was the principal devisee under his will.

. There were no children of the marriage. The wife had a child by a prior marriage and was entitled to child support from her prior husband,

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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