holding that nurses’ conduct was not “outrageous,” even though one nurse told plaintiff, after she delivered a still born child unassisted into a bed pan, to “shut up,” and even though the other nurse told plaintiff in response to her question about what was to become of the stillborn fetus, “Honey, we dispose of them right here at the hospital”
How later courts described this case
- holding that nurses’ conduct was not “outrageous,” even though one nurse told plaintiff, after she delivered a still born child unassisted into a bed pan, to “shut up,” and even though the other nurse told plaintiff in response to her question about what was to become of the stillborn fetus, “Honey, we dispose of them right here at the hospital”
- holding that a 12 to 15 minute delay in responding to a hospital patient who had just given birth to a still born baby in a bedpan, telling the woman to “shut up” and informing her that the baby would be “disposed of’ on the hospital premises was not sufficiently outrageous to constitute a tort
- finding that a nurse’s action in informing the mother of a recently stillborn infant “that [her] baby would be disposed of in the hospital” was “cold, callous, and lacking sensitivity, but [that] it certainly is not part of a pattern of conduct that ‘is beyond all decency’”
- holding that nurse’s conduct in telling patient to “shut up” and informing her that her stillborn baby would be disposed of at the hospital was insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment under the facts of this case. In Craft v. Rice, Ky., 671 S.W.2d 247 (1984), we adopted Section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Comment h to that section provides:
“It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.” [Emphasis added]
In Craft the harassment of Mr. and Mrs. Craft continued over a period of three months. Craft does not, however, require the acts to take place over an extended period of time in order to make a case for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The acts of harassment must be intentional *5 and substantial, but there is no time framework necessarily controlling. The state of the law in this area is still developing, and we must look to the facts in each case. Harassment cannot be proved by a single spontaneous act but here there was evidence from which a jury might infer multiple acts constituting a continuous, intentional course of action.
Ms. Seitz had been in the hospital for ten days with complications with her “high risk” pregnancy. There was evidence the staff had come to view her as a problem patient. The Majority states that there was no proof that her intercom had been turned off and the delay of the nursing staff for 12-15 minutes may have been negligent “but it is hardly intentional, outrageous or reckless conduct.” Eleven nurses testified in pre-trial depositions that the call light was in fact working. If that was the case, then the failure of any of the nurses to respond to her call for help for 12-15 minutes may well suggest intentional harassment of the patient. Ms. Seitz had already given birth to a stillborn child in a bedpan. A 12-15 minute wait for nursing assistance may well be a veritable “lifetime” under these circumstances.
An Arizona case, Lucchesi v. Frederic N. Stimmell, M.D., Ltd., 149 Ariz. 76 , 716 P.2d 1013 (1986), is analogous. A patient with a “high risk” pregnancy was transported to a specific facility to be assisted by a doctor with special medical skills. There was a dispute as to whether the doctor had assured the patient’s private physician that he would be waiting for her when she was transported. The doctor failed to come to the hospital despite the fact that he had been advised of the patient’s complications after she arrived. Since the doctor was not present, a first-year intern and a third-year resident without experience with this type of complication had to deliver the baby. Not only was the child stillborn but was decapitated during the birth process as a result of the resident’s procedure. Later, when Dr. Stimmell arrived at the hospital he failed to reveal to the patient what had happened during the delivery. She found out later from her own doctor. The Arizona Supreme Court, sitting en banc, reversed the grant of summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and held:
“[T]he evidence concerning Dr. Stim-mell’s conduct before, during and after the birth of the Lucchesis’ child created a factual issue so that a jury should have had an opportunity to decide whether defendant’s conduct was outrageous ... the existence of several factual inconsistencies in the record was sufficient to have precluded the entry of summary judgment [citation omitted].” Id. 149 Ariz. at 80 , 716 P.2d at 1017 .
Here, a jury should have been given the opportunity to decide whether the conduct of the nursing staff before, during and after the birth of Ms. Seitz’ child was outrageous. A jury should also have been allowed to consider the special relationship of patient-nurse and whether the nursing staff had knowledge of the patient’s susceptibility to emotional distress per comment e and comment f of the Restatement.
I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
COMBS and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissent.