Opinion

La Sara Grain Co. v. First National Bank of Mercedes

  • 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 382
  • 673 S.W.2d 558
  • 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 963
  • 1984 Tex. LEXIS 351
Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
May 23, 1984
Status
Published
Author
Barrow
On the bench
Spears, Barrow
Cited by
403 cases
Authority
More cited than 10.8%

holding that deposit creates an implied agreement that bank will disburse funds only in accordance with depositor’s instructions

How later courts described this case

  • holding that deposit creates an implied agreement that bank will disburse funds only in accordance with depositor’s instructions
  • holding that “an obligation of good faith is imposed on the performance of every contract or duty with the [Texas Uniform Commercial] Code” and citing the § 1.203, the predecessor provision relating to the duty of good faith
  • holding that a lender "may be subject to a [Deceptive Trade Practices Act] claim if the borrower’s 'objective' is the purchase or *1294 lease of a good or service thereby qualifying the borrower as a consumer”
  • holding bank liable for paying checks on an unauthorized signature under Tex.Bus. & Com.Code Ann. § 4.406 where bank paid cheek drawn from La Sara’s account by employee with signa-toe authority despite corporate resolution requiring bank to pay checks only upon the signatures of two of four authorized signatories

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

BARROW, Justice,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent in part. I would remand this cause to the court of appeals for consideration of the bank’s factual insufficiency point. By that point, the bank complains of the finding that it had actual knowledge of the unauthorized change in the signature card.

This court does not have jurisdiction of points that attack the factual sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a jury finding. Hurst v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 647 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex.1983); Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. arts. 1728, 1821. As the majority points out, the bank urged under one point that there was no evidence to support the jury finding, or in the alternative the evidence was factually insufficient to support that finding. This manner of presentation is expressly authorized by Rule 418(d), Tex.R. Civ.P., as amended January 1, 1981. Furthermore, the bank’s argument was fully presented under this point because the same record references and legal arguments support both the no evidence and the factual insufficiency contentions.

I agree that there is “some evidence” to support the jury finding, but we do not have jurisdiction to consider the factual insufficiency contention.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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