disagreeing with the hypothesis that the lack of ability to prove harm equals the lack of harm itself, but acknowledging that this reasoning appears to drive each of the Court of Criminal Appeals's Cain[1] analyses
How later courts described this case
- disagreeing with the hypothesis that the lack of ability to prove harm equals the lack of harm itself, but acknowledging that this reasoning appears to drive each of the Court of Criminal Appeals's Cain[1] analyses
- distinguishing deprivation of right to counsel from deprivation of component right to conduct voir dire
- stating that trial court’s impermissible exclusion of proper question during voir dire is subject to harmless-error analysis
- finding that the Texarkana Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the error is incapable of analysis for harm
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MEYERS, J.,
delivered this concurring opinion.
Since promulgation of the new harmless error rule, Tex.R.App. PRoc. 44.2, we have issued just one opinion analyzing voir dire error thereunder. Jones v. State, 982 S.W.2d 386 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). That case involved the erroneous removal of a prospective juror for cause. Assessing harm and concluding the defendant’s “substantial rights” were not violated, the Court reasoned:
[A] defendant has no right that any particular individual serve on the jury. The defendant’s only substantial right is that the jurors who do serve be quali-ned. The defendant’s rights go to those who serve, not to those who are excluded.
Id. at 393 . The instant case involves the denial of a proper question. The determinative question for the Court of Appeals on remand is whether the “substantial right” at issue in Jones (essentially, the defendant’s right to a fair and impartial jury) is different from the “substantial right” at issue in the context here. With these comments, I concur in the judgment of the Court.