stating that mental anguish damages could not be awarded without either “direct evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of their mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in plaintiffs’ daily routine,” or other evidence of “a high degree of mental pain and distress that is more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger”
How later courts described this case
- stating that mental anguish damages could not be awarded without either “direct evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of their mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in plaintiffs’ daily routine,” or other evidence of “a high degree of mental pain and distress that is more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger”
- holding that mental anguish claimant must introduce direct evidence of nature, duration, and severity of alleged anguish, establishing substantial disruption in daily routine, or evidence of high degree of mental pain and distress that is more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger
- holding that homeowners bringing action in connection with the flooding of their home received improper double recovery when they were allowed an award of both cost of repairs and diminution of value of their home, because the diminution in value was calculated assuming that no repairs had, been made
- stating “that an award of mental anguish damages will survive a legal sufficiency challenge when the plaintiffs have introduced direct evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of their mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in the plaintiffs’ daily routine”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Nikisha Shonte Neal v. State (2005)
However, we distinguish Woodruff from the
Distinguished by a later decision (2005)
However, we distinguish Woodruff from the
The opinion
Justice GAMMAGE,
dissenting.
I dissent to that part of the majority opinion which refuses to recognize an implied *446 warranty cause of action in this case. I agree that the Woodruffs were awarded a double recovery when they received both the cost of repairs and the diminution in value of the home which was calculated assuming no repairs were made. I also agree that the Woodruffs presented insufficient evidence to support an award for mental anguish damages. I do not agree with the majority, however, that the Woodruffs do not have a cause of action under the DTPA.
The majority maintains that the Woodruffs do not have a cause of action under the DTPA based upon either implied warranty or unconseionability theories. I believe the Woodruffs do present facts giving rise to a cause of action for Parkway’s breach of an implied service warranty.
As the majority notes, this Court has recognized an implied warranty “to repair or modify existing tangible goods or property in a good and workmanlike manner” in Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 354 (Tex.1987) (emphasis added). The court of appeals correctly held that the applicability of an implied warranty is not negated because the Woodruffs did not purchase their home from the builder. An implied warranty of good and workmanlike construction from a builder/vendor extends to the remote purchaser. Gupta v. Ritter Homes, Inc., 646 S.W.2d 168 (Tex.1983); see also Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex.1977).
The majority concludes, however, that Parkway did not impliedly agree to perform future development services “for the Wood-ruffs’ benefit.” But the issue is not whether Parkway agreed to provide development services/or the Woodruffs’ benefit; it is whether Parkway impliedly agreed to conduct its future development in a manner not detrimental to the Woodruffs and consistent with the scheme of the master-planned community. When the Woodruffs purchased their house, they contracted not only for a house but also for a master-planned community — a developed neighborhood. They were forced to rely on Parkway for its expertise on the technical aspects of building a housing development, including its skills in providing adequate drainage for all lots, because the Woodruffs lacked the knowledge and ability to do so themselves.
As the court of appeals notes, “a homebuyer/consumer cannot, by reasonable examination, discern or anticipate irresponsible or defective subdivision development activities.” 857 S.W.2d 903, 911 . It is reasonable for a consumer to expect that when he or she buys into a housing community under development the developer will conduct its future development activities without affirmatively damaging their property. Certainly no reasonable homebuyer would purchase a house with the expectation that the neighborhood’s developer would take affirmative action to damage the buyer’s property. A developer or builder selling property in a development community may not be impliedly warranting for future development services, but equity demands that he does warrant to not in the future violate the development’s master plan in such a way as to interfere with purchasers’ reasonably anticipated use and enjoyment of their property.
Service provided in a good and workmanlike manner means “that quality of work performed by one who has the knowledge, training, or experience necessary for the successful practice of a trade or occupation and performed in a manner generally considered proficient by those capable of judging such work.” Melody Home, 741 S.W.2d at 354 . As this Court pointed out in Melody Home, “a service provider is in a much better position to prevent loss than is the consumer of the service.... [A] consumer should be able to rely upon the expertise of the service provider.” Id. at 353 . In this case, Parkway, as the developer, was in the better position to ensure that its construction on lots adjoining the Woodruffs’ would not result in property damage to other lots and homes in the area. As a professional developer, Parkway impliedly warranted that it would competently furnish development services. By intentionally flooding developed lots and homes, Parkway breached the implied warranty to repair or modify existing property in a good or workmanlike manner.
I would find Parkway liable under the DTPA for breach of the implied warranty to repair or modify existing property in a good *447 and workmanlike manner. This cause should be remanded for trial under alternative theories of negligence and DTPA. I respectfully dissent.