holding that the trial court's improper denial of defendant's challenge for cause under Art. 35.16(c)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was subject to a harmless error analysis under Rule 44.2(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
How later courts described this case
- holding that the trial court's improper denial of defendant's challenge for cause under Art. 35.16(c)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was subject to a harmless error analysis under Rule 44.2(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
- holding trial court abused its discretion in denying challenge for cause to two prospective jurors who “stated unequivocally” they could not consider assessing the applicable minimum legal punishment
- holding that the tidal court erred by erroneously denying the appellant’s two challenges for cause
- holding that the trial court erred by erroneously denying the appellant's two challenges for cause
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MEYERS, Judge,
concurring.
I concur. In Texas, a prospective juror who cannot consider the full range of punishment, as set out by the law, is challengeable for cause. Fuller v. State, 829 S.W.2d 191, 200 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. 941 , 113 S.Ct. 2418 , 124 L.Ed.2d 640 (1993); see also Woodkins v. State, 542 S.W.2d 855, 862 (Tex.Crim.App.1976).
The range of punishment is set by statute. In the present case, the relevant statute makes no distinction between one convicted as a party and one convicted as a principal— both are subject to the same range of punishment if found guilty. As the majority points out, a juror who cannot keep an open mind as to the full range of punishment — that is, remain open to the idea that in some circumstances the minimum punishment will be appropriate and in some circumstances the maximum will be appropriate — is challengea-ble for cause via Article 35.16(c)(2) or Article 35.16(b)(3) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
*407 The rule set out in the majority opinion is that a prospective juror who cannot consider that in some circumstances the minimum punishment allowed would be appropriate for one convicted as a principal would be chal-lengeable for cause. I note that the same rule would apply in the opposite situation — a prospective juror who could not consider that in some circumstances the maximum punishment allowed would be appropriate for one convicted as a party would also be challenge-able for cause.
With these remarks, I join the majority opinion.