holding venue proper in Harris County for prosecution of aggregate theft arising out of a single scheme, even though offenses against some complainants took place outside Harris County because alleged out-of-county offenses arise from same scheme or continuing course of conduct as Harris County offenses
How later courts described this case
- holding venue proper in Harris County for prosecution of aggregate theft arising out of a single scheme, even though offenses against some complainants took place outside Harris County because alleged out-of-county offenses arise from same scheme or continuing course of conduct as Harris County offenses
- noting that the “main purpose” of the 1974 addition of Section 31.09 was to “increase the punishment range for a thief who commits various thefts” because under the common law, a person who “stole x amount from various victims at different times could not be as severely punished as a thief who stole the same amount from one victim at one time even though the Legislature considered these two thieves to be equally culpable”
- discussing 63rd Legislature’s consolidation of various separately defined theft offenses into one general theft offense that said “thou shalt not steal”
- hold ing that venue is proper in any county in which any element of any of the underlying thefts occurred
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*896 PRICE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the judgment of the majority, and I join the first part of the majority opinion, which makes its determination on the basis of statutory analysis. However, I dissent as to the latter portion, which discusses legislative history. Under our approach to statutory interpretation, we look to the literal text of the statute for its meaning, and we ordinarily give effect to that plain meaning. Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The only exceptions to this rule are where application of the statute’s plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended, or if the plain language is ambiguous. Id. Because the plain language of the relevant statutes is not ambiguous, and because a literal interpretation of those statutes does not lead to an absurd result, we need not, and indeed should not, consider the legislative history. Id. at 785-786 .