stating that to admit an 6 extraneous matter for identity purposes, the defendant’s “‘signature’ must be apparent from a comparison of circumstances in both cases”
How later courts described this case
- stating that to admit an 6 extraneous matter for identity purposes, the defendant’s “‘signature’ must be apparent from a comparison of circumstances in both cases”
- explaining that when identity is disputed, probative value outweighs a prejudicial effect to admit extraneous-offense evidence upon a showing of distinguishing characteristics, common to all offenses, that earmark a defendant = s handiwork as a A signature @
- noting that defendant acting unilaterally can commit “murder for remuneration” and overruling Doty to extent that it limited murder for remuneration to situations involving “a minimum of’ three actors
- holding defendant’s admission that she killed victim corroborated accomplice’s testimony
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DUNCAN, Judge,
concurring.
I think the majority opinion is absolutely correct in its analysis of V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 19.03(a)(3). In addition to the syntactical conclusions advanced by the majority relative to the word “remuneration,” I have another, albeit less esoteric, basis for concluding that V.T.C.A. Penal Code, 19.-03(a)(3), is applicable to the facts of this case. The Texas murder for remuneration statute necessitates that the murder be committed for achieving a monetary gain. Admittedly, the usual scenario is when one hires another to kill. It seems to me, however, that it would be rather illogical to legislatively authorize the death penalty for one that hires another to kill, but exclude from that classification one that accepts the burden of killing for the purpose of gaining monetarily. In essence, the appellant simply hired herself to kill the deceased, assured in her own mind that she would monetarily benefit from her own conduct. Just because she elected to commit the murder herself, rather than depend upon another to do it, should not make her invulnerable to the death penalty. Now, she isn’t.