“Neither can we agree with appellant’s contention that appellee . . . , by the voluntary disclosure of the identity of one of her sources, waived whatever privilege she had.”
How later courts described this case
- “Neither can we agree with appellant’s contention that appellee . . . , by the voluntary disclosure of the identity of one of her sources, waived whatever privilege she had.”
- reporter's voluntary disclosure of identity of confidential source to her boss and a deputy prosecuting attorney did not constitute waiver
- disclosure of one source did not waive privilege as to others
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
George Howard, Jr., Justice, concurring. I concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s action in granting a summary judgment in behalf of appellees, Arkansas Gazette Company and Carol Griffee, resulting in a dismissal of the complaint filed by appellant, Executive Director of the Arkansas Soil and Water Conservation Commission, a public official of the State of Arkansas, alleging that he was libeled by appellees and, accordingly, sought damages in the sum of $1,000,000.00. While the Court bases its decision on appellant’s failure to meet certain State statutory requirements, I base my vote to affirm on the belief that the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution afford a greater protection to the press and citizens to criticize and comment freely on the manner in which public officials perform their public stewardship.
It is my view that the privilege to criticize public officials’ conduct, despite the possible harm that might develop, is unconditional and absolute. See: Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 , 62 S. Ct. 190 ; N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 , 83 S. Ct. 328 . Relevant parts of the First Amendment provide as follows:
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”
It is universally recognized that the above quoted First Amendment provisions are applicable to States under and pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The position that I take in this case does not mean, however, that the First Amendment protection extends to libelous matters directed against the private conduct of a public official or private citizen.
Generally, legislators, judges, administrative and executive officials possess absolute immunity against liability for defamatory words spoken in connection with their public duties. See: Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 , 79 S. Ct. 1335 ; City of Chicago v. Tribune Company, 139 N.E. 86 . The reason asserted for this immunity is that public officials should be unhampered, or uninhibited, in any way, in serving the public will. Thus, it seems not only from the standpoint of First Amendment protection, but even within the scope of equal protection of the law, that the press and citizens should likewise be immune from their criticism of official conduct. In this way, the press and citizens will be free “to applaud or to criticize the way public employees do their jobs from the least to the most. ” See: Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Black in Barr v. Matteo, supra.
One may inquire, if the press is afforded an absolute privilege, what protection is there against abuse and reckless reporting. I submit that not only is there an opportunity for the public official to respond with the truth in order to illustrate any unsubstantiated opinions or deliberate misstatements, but those news media that are susceptible to indulging in irresponsible reporting would run the risk of losing credibility and influence in the community. Abridgement of a free press is not the solution. Moreover, it must be remembered that a public official who has assumed the responsibility of handling the peoples’ business must expect criticism and comments about his stewardship.
I believe the Court should have gone beyond the statutory law in affirming this case and, accordingly, I submit this concurring opinion.